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MUNICIPAL PARKLAND IN NEW YORK

[T]rust principles provide a valuable underpinning, but no more
than that, for ... planning. Successful ... regulation will rest on
coherent legislative and administrative goals and on their
intelligent and understanding implementation.... [L]egislators and
coastal administrators can and should take an active role in shaping
the application of the public trust doctrine and public trust
principles in their state, by developing strategies and mechanisms
to incorporate the public trust doctrine into state constitutions,
statutes, and regulatory programs, as well as to structure court
cases creating favorable judicial precedents.'
INTRODUCTION

The Angel of the Waters hovers above Bethesda Fountain in
Central Park. The imposing bronze statue celebrates completion of
the Croton Aqueduct, which brought clean surface water into New
York City for the first time in 1842.2 Piping water in from
Westchester County had been a massive engineering achievement,
designed to help stop cholera epidemics, fight fires, and provide for
the masses crowding the metropolitan area.3 The gift of fresh water
bubbling out of fountains and pipes seemed to New Yorkers of the
mid-nineteenth century a healing gift from angels worthy of a park
statue.4 One hundred and fifty years later, by the end of the

1. JACK ARCHER ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE & THE
MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA'S COASTS ix & 179 (1994) (arguing for
an incorporation of public trust principles from common law into
state constitutions statutes, and regulations).

2. DENNIS BURTON, NATURE WALKS OF CENTRAL PARK 138-39
(1997); RICHARD J. BERENSON & RAYMOND CARROLL,
ILLUSTRATED MAP AND GUIDEBOOK TO CENTRAL PARK 41 (Barnes
& Noble 1999). Prior to 1842 New Yorkers had relied principally
on wells in an overburdened groundwater aquifer. See DIANE
GALUSHA, LIQUID ASSETS: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK CITY'S WATER
SYSTEM (1999) at 11-17.
3. EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE WALLACE, GOTHAM, A
HISTORY OF NEW YORK CITY TO

1898 594-95, 625-27 (1999);

Galusha, supra note 2, at 17 (yellow fever, cholera and fire).
4. BERENSON, supra note 2, at 41; BURTON, supra note 2, at 139.
For instance the name for Bethesda Fountain came from the New
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twentieth century, it was clear that Croton water was no longer
pristine and further treatment was necessary.' This Note discusses
the controversy surrounding city attempts to place the water
treatment plant in a municipal park. It also examines broader issues
of park purposes and allowable park uses under New York common
law. The Note argues that common law protections of municipal
parkland under the public trust doctrine6 are important but not
sufficient and suggests ways to strengthen the concept of a common
public trust resource of municipal parkland while adapting to
changing technologies and cultural expectations.
Historically,7 certain lands have been protected under common law
as a public trust8 resource held by the sovereign state9 for the

Testament account of an angel bestowing health-giving properties to
the pool of Bethesda near Jerusalem. Id.
5. See, e.g., Peter H. Lehner, Avoiding the Path of Good
Intentions: Protecting the Watershed Through Better Enforcement,
12 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 523, 523-26 (2002) (listing contaminants
such as road runoff, microbes, heavy metals, and synthetic organics).
High levels of phosphorus and algae regularly shut down the Croton
reservoirs during the summer. See Galusha, supra note 2, at 150-53
(recounting history of debate on filtering city water).
6. See, e.g., JOHN CRONIN & ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., THE
RIVERKEEPERS:
Two ACTIVISTS FIGHT TO RECLAIM OUR
ENVIRONMENT AS A BASIC HUMAN RIGHT 141 (1999). "According

to the Public Trust Doctrine, the public owns common or shared
environments-air, water, dunes, tidelands, underwater lands,
fisheries, shellfish beds, parks and commons, and migratory species.
.Government trustees are obligated to maintain the value of these
systems for all users-including future generations. Like other
rights, public trust rights are said to derive from 'natural' or Godgiven law. They cannot be extinguished." Id.
7. See CRONIN & KENNEDY, supra note 6, at 141-44. The
public trust doctrine, goes back at least to the Roman civil law; it
was incorporated into English common law after the Magna Carta,
and was adopted by the original American colonies. Id. Contra
Geoffrey R. Scott, The ExpandingPublic Trust Doctrine: A Warning
to Environmentalists and Policy Makers, 10 FORDHAM ENVTL L.J. 1,
24-36 (1998) (contesting assertions that the public trust doctrine has
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people.' 0 A public trust requires that the trust land be accessible and
used for public purpose; that it be put to traditional or uses
appropriate to the resource; and, in some cases, that it not be sold."
Public trust protections have been promoted as instruments of
democratization and equal access to resources. 2 Although the

deep historical roots and asserting that it is a relatively modern tool
for advancing political agendas).
8. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1513-14 (7th ed. 1999)
(defining a public trust when property is held by a trustee for the
benefit of the general public).
9. See id. at 1401-02 (defining a sovereign state as one with
independent existence and central authority). The sovereignty or
rule, which was exercised by the crown of England, for example,
passed to the people of the thirteen colonies. Id.; see also ARCHER
ET AL., supra note 1, at 8-9. Other states entered the Union on an
equal footing, with complete power over its public trust lands. Id.
10. See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 387-89, 452-53
(1892) (ruling that a state may not convey public trust property if the
public's interest in remaining public trust lands is impaired); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476-79 (1988) (holding
each state entered the Union with sovereignty over all tidal and
navigable waters and lands beneath them and could later expand its
public trust authority).
11. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 477
(1971); see also CRONIN & KENNEDY, supra note 6, at 143. Reciting

Supreme Court public trust cases and summarizing judicial
interpretation. "The public trust resources of America are owned by
the public ... and no one has the right to use them in a way that will

diminish their use and enjoyment by others. The state, as trustee,
has no authority to enact policies that favor one public user over
another." Id.
12. See Sax, supra note 11, at 560-61 (explaining that the central
task for courts in public trust cases is democratization through giving
voice to a diffuse majority); CRONIN & KENNEDY, supra note 6, at
156 (viewing the struggle over natural resources as inseparable from
the struggle for democracy).

264

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. XII

doctrine has been applied to lands covered by tidal waters 3 and
navigable freshwaters,14 states have discretion in applying public
trust authority. 5
The public trust doctrine has been an important and controversial
influence on environmental law at least since the early 1970s. 16 John
Cronin and Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. propose that the common law
public trust doctrine (as well as nuisance laws) provided the7
philosophical underpinning for the major environmental statutes.
Whether or not they are correct that it is the source of fundamental
environmental rights, 8 a public trust approach has shaped
environmental statutes, 9 and even constitutions" of certain states.
13. See, e.g., Town of Oyster Bay v. Commander Oil Corp., 759
N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (N.Y. 2001) (applying public trust principles to a
shore owner in Oyster Bay Harbor in Nassau County).
14. See Robert J. Kafin, Ancient Principles of Navigability to
Have a Modem Applicability, 19 N.Y. ENVTL. LAW 15 (1999)
(reporting on a long conflict over passage by canoes and kayaks in
small waterways). The extent of public trust protection in navigable
waters has long been a contentious issue. Id. Although the New
York Court of Appeals granted public trust passage to recreational
boaters in one case, the question of navigability appears to be factspecific. See id at 17-18 (discussing New York Court of Appeals
cases).
15. See PhillipsPetroleum, 484 U.S. at 483.
16. See, e.g., JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY
LAW 500 (2000). 'The public trust doctrine is one of the most farreaching and controversial rules defining the legal relationship
between private owners and the environment." Id.
17. See CRONIN & KENNEDY, supra note 6, at 145. "[C]ourts and
Congress began to breathe life into the moribund Public Trust
Doctrine, raising it up in a new iteration: modern environmental law
...

the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, The Endangered Species

Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act are all best
understood as a modem guarantee of the protection of ancient public
trust rights in an industrial age." Id.
18. See id. at 9 (describing Kennedy's belief in a fundamental
right of protection from pollution and environmental abuse).
19. See David Gionfriddo, Comment, Sealing Pandora's Box:
Judicial Doctrines Restricting Public Trust Citizens Environmental
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Professor Joseph Sax authored an influential 1971 article praising
the public trust doctrine as an "instrument for democratization" and
enhanced natural resource protection.2 1 His scholarship provoked
decades of debate about the value and role of judicial protection of
common resources.2 2 Pro-public trust writers applaud his efforts and
tend to advocate for expansion of resources protected to include
national parks,23 groundwater, 4 and biodiversity 25 and others.2 6 AntiSuits, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 439, 443 (1986) (describing how
Professor Joseph Sax relied on the public trust doctrine as a
foundation when helping to draft Michigan's environmental policy
statute of 1970).
20. See PHILIP WEINBERG & KEVIN A. REILLY, UNDERSTANDING
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 53 (1998) (describing how California's
constitution guaranteed public access to the shore); see also Erin
Ryan, Comment, Public Trust and Distrust: The Theoretical
Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource
Management, 31 ENVTL L. 477, 477-78 (2001). The Pennsylvania
constitution contains public trust rights to natural resources. Id.
21. See Sax, supra note 11 at 491-92 (defining public trust
approval by legislatures of administrative agency decisions about
natural resources as an instrument of democratization); CRONIN &
KENNEDY, supra note 6, at 145 (illustrating democratic action as
building communities through environmental activism).
22. A symposium and volume of commentary was recently
devoted to criticism of Joseph Sax's scholarship on natural resource
law. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Foreword to Takings, Public
Trust, Unhappy Truths, and Helpless Giants: A Review of Professor
Joseph Sax's Defense of the Environment Through Academic
Scholarship,25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325-26 (1998).
23. Cf Sally K. Fairfax, The Essential Legacy of a Sustaining
Civilization: ProfessorSax on the NationalParks, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q.
385, 385-88 (1998) (reviewing Sax's scholarship on park
protections).
24. See, e.g., Erik Swenson, Comment, Public Trust Doctrine and
Groundwater Rights, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 363, 363-64 (1991)
(advocating public trust protections of groundwater).
25. See, e.g., William C. Galloway, Protection of Biodiversity
Under the Public Trust Doctrine, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 21, 21-22, 32
(1994) (public trust protections of biodiversity).
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public trust commentators criticize the theoretical 27 and historical28
bases of the doctrine, finding it variously weak, dangerous, 29 and
unconstitutional.3" Other legal writers have taken a more nuanced
approach, analyzing the resurgence of the public trust doctrine in a
context of cultural history.3 ' Finally, some academics have critiqued
the doctrine as being based on outdated concepts of private and
public property and making analysis and action more difficult. 2 In
26. See, e.g., Scott B. Yates, Comment, A Case for the Extension
of the Public Trust Doctrine in Oregon, 27 ENVTL. L. 663, 663 &
695 (1997) (arguing that common law and state statutes support
application of public trust protections to maintenance of adequate
stream flows in non-navigable tributaries); see also Peter Manus, To
a Candidate In Search of an Environmental Theme: Promote the
Public Trust, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 315, 315-19, 367-69 (2000)
(suggesting that 2000 presidential candidate Al Gore rely on the
public trust doctrine).
27. See, e.g., Eric Pearson, Illinois Central and the Public Trust
Doctrine in State Law, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 713, 717-21 (1996)
(questioning interpretations of early Supreme Court decisions by
commentators like Sax who find them as supportive of public trust
protections).
28. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 7, at 24-36 (questioning the
historical basis of the public trust doctrine and finding it to be a
dangerous tool of political intent which undercuts judicial precedent
and property interests).
29. See id. at 68-70 (public trust undermines property rights and
expectations).
30. See, e.g., James Rasband, Equitable Compensationfor Public
Trust Takings, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1135, 1335-36 (1998).
31. See, e.g., Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom,
Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711,
711-23 (1986) (analyzing the common law basis of the public trust
doctrine through a law and economics model); Carol Rose, Joseph
Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 EcOLOGY L.Q. 351, 351-52,
361-62 (1998) (suggesting that the success and impact of the public
trust resurgence was due in part to its catchy name).
32. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of
Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the
Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IowA L. REV. 631, 633. "By continuing to
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that vein, Richard Delgado argues that public trust theory has
already been successfully incorporated into legislative and judicial
approaches and now acts as a constraint on innovative new
approaches to environmental protection.33
One thing that all commentators might agree on is the importance
of context in any analysis of this topic. The states have formulated
public trust protections in differing ways.34 Critics seize on the
variability as proof that the public trust doctrine means everything
and nothing and is an attempt to advance an environmental agenda
by manipulation.35 Proponents of public trust protections examine
the details of evolution and application in different states.36 Not
surprisingly, each observer tends to find support in detailed study for
their particular views on private property rights or environmental
protection.37 In the context of New York State, it is not clear why

resist a legal system that is otherwise being abandoned, the public
trust doctrine obscures analysis and renders more difficult the
important process of reworking natural resources law." Id.
33. Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of
Joseph Sax's Public Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and
Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform, 44 VAND. L.
REv. 1209, 1209-12 (1991).
34. See Scott, supra note 7, at 16-23 (listing differences between
and within states in what lands are covered, the time over which
measurements is made, what resources are protected, underlying
purposes, how government has acquired the land in question and
whether the government may transfer land).
35. See, e.g., id at 15-16, 23, 70 (contending that the public trust
doctrine is used in its inconsistent manifestations to promote a
philosophical/social agenda undercutting property interests).
36. See, e.g., BONNIE J. MCCAY, OYSTER WARS AND THE PUBLIC
TRUST: PROPERTY, LAW AND ECOLOGY IN NEW JERSEY HISTORY xv-

xxxi & 189-203 (attempting through an examination of the New
Jersey "Oyster Wars" to prove that a public trust approach is viable).
37. Compare id. (criticizing a "tragedy of the commons"
argument for privatization with support from evidence of the "Oyster
Wars"), with James Rasband, The Public Trust Doctrine:A Tragedy
of the Common Law, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1335, 1336 (1999) (reviewing
MCCAY, supra note 36, and using the same Oyster Wars to argue for
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and how the courts initially applied public trust protections to
municipal parks, as well as tidal lands and navigable waters.
New York courts have a long tradition of extending public trust
protections to municipal parks by requiring specific state legislative
authorization for sale, alienations,3 8 or non-park uses39 of the land.4"
New York protections of parkland41 differ from application of the
public trust to tidal or shore areas, which can be sold but still retain
public trust protections. 2 In New York, municipal parkland may not
stronger enforcement of constitutional protections against taking of
private property).
38. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 73 (defining
alienation as the "conveyance or transfer of property to another").
Modem courts tend to use the term "alienation" to encompass any
impermissible use of public parkland from sale to unauthorized use
of parkland. See, e.g., United States v. New York, 96 F. Supp. 2d
195, 202 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing how courts have extended the
meaning of alienation from, conveyances of parkland, to any nonrecreational use of parkland).
39. Williams v. Gallatin 128 N.E. 121 (N.Y. 1920). Non-park
uses are uses of a park that are inconsistent with park purposes. Id.;
see infra Part II.B.
40. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF PARKS, RECREATION &
HISTORIC PRES., GUIDE TO THE ALIENATION OR CONVERSION OF

MUNICIPAL PARKLANDS i-ii (1990).

"[A]lienation . . . applies to

every municipal park in the state... In order to convey parklands to
another entity, or use them for another purpose, the municipality
must receive the authorization of the State Legislature. The bill by
which the Legislature grants its authorization is a 'parkland
alienation bill."' Id. at i.
41. In this Note, use of the word "parkland" connotes New York
municipal parkland. Conveyances of state parkland can often be
governed by state statutes or the terms of dedication and may not
require legislative authorization. See id. at 6. Conveyances of
federal parkland are termed "conversions" and are governed by
federal statutes and guidelines. See id. at i-ii.
42. See Town of Oyster Bay v. Commander Oil Corp., 759
N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (N.Y. 2001) (balancing property rights of
riparian owner and the town which held tidal lands and oyster beds
"in trust for the public good").
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be sold without legislative authorization.43 However, common law
offers little guidance on what are purposes and proper uses of land
that remains a park." Conflict arises over the uses of parkland as
allowed by the municipal agencies that administer them.45 Suits to
enjoin an activity or proposed action as an impermissible alienation
of parkland are often brought against park agencies, park
commissioners, or the municipality itself. 6 Statutory controls and
regulations have not been as important as the common law in New
York park protection cases.47

43. See Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234, 243
(1871); see also discussion infra Part I.A.
44. See discussion infra Part II.B. 1-2.
45. See David Gionfriddo, supra note 19, at 443-44 (pointing out
that traditional protections are often lowered for public works
projects). See, e.g., NATURAL RES. GROUP, CITY OF N.Y./PARKS &
RECREATION, FOREVER WILD (2000), at http://nycparks.complete
inet.net/subabout/parkscdivisions/nrg/forever-wild/nrg-foreverwi
ld.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2002).
46. See discussion infra Part II.B. 1.
47. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20.2 (McKinney 2002). "[T]he
rights of a city in and to its waterfront, ferries, bridges, wharves,
property, land under water, public landings, wharves, docks, streets,
avenues, parks and all other public places, are hereby declared to be
inalienable, except in the cases provided for by subdivision seven of
this section." Id. Generally, subdivision seven is not viewed as
reducing the inalienability of parklands. See In re Central Parkway,
251 N.Y.S. 577, 580-81 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1931)
(holding that subdivision seven does not give a city power to
discontinue or sell a park); Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 330
N.Y.S.2d 495, 510 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (affirming In re
Central Parkway, 251 N.Y.S. at 577 and additionally finding no
authority in the city charter to restrict the use of the park). Language
in the New York City Charter generally follows that of General City
Law and has been interpreted similarly. See Aldrich v. City of New
York, 145 N.Y.S.2d 732, 743-44 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1955)
(finding in New York City Charter § 383 no express power to
discontinue or close a park); see also New York City Charter ch. 9, §
383 (2001).
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This Note argues that common law public trust protections are
important but not sufficient without support from other branches of
government and acknowledged citizen involvement to provide
meaningful protections for public parks. This note assumes, without
trying to prove, that parks are important for all citizens, but
especially for densely crowded urban populations.48 The note relies
largely on examples, cases and information from New York City,
based on an assumption that issues faced by the Department of Parks
and Recreation ("DPR") highlight or foreshadow conflicts and
questions that may arise elsewhere in large urban areas.49 Part I
presents the three most important New York cases involving public
trust protections of parkland. Part II contends that although public
trust protections are essential, they are limited by lack of clear
definitions and scope.
Common law protections have also
sometimes been ignored, resulting in a confusing mix of pre-existing
alienating uses and customs that may undercut present guidelines.
Protections are limited in situations where it is not clear where park
jurisdiction lies, or even whether a municipal park exists. Part III
suggests that common law public trust protections can be improved
by legislative and regulatory support, additional common law
doctrines, and inter-governmental cooperation with citizen
involvement. The note concludes that public trust protections are an
interesting and useful judicial concept, but one that will become less
relevant in a rapidly changing world without clearer guidelines from
48. See PETER HARNIK, INSIDE CITY PARKS 1-4 (1985) (pointing
out that city parks often define urban layout, property value, traffic
flow, and even whether a city is a desirable place to live that will
attract new inhabitants, businesses, and jobs).
49. The New York City Department of Parks and Recreation has
well over 28,000 acres under its jurisdiction. See CITY OF
N.Y./PARKS

&

RECREATION,

FREQUENTLY

ASKED

QUESTIONS

(2000), at http://nycparks.completeinet.net/subfaqs/parkjfaqs.html
(last visited Apr. 14, 2002). If state and federal parkland is added in,
as well as cemeteries and open space, the total is about 53,000 acres.
See HARNIK, supra note 48, at 121. In fact the total park and open
space acreage in New York City, at almost 27%, is the largest of any
major city in the country. See id. at 126. Central Park is thought by
many to be the most successful city park in the world, the "standard
against which all other parks are measured." Id. at 9.
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legislators, strong executive leadership and funding to protect parks
and make them accessible to involved citizens who care about them.

I. NEW YORK PROVIDES PUBLIC TRUST PROTECTIONS FOR
MUNICIPAL PARKLAND

Under New York common law, a municipality holds parkland in
trust for the people of the state, and the people's trust may not be
diminished or infringed upon without specific authorization by
statute from the state legislature.50 Three landmark cases are useful
introductions to how public trust protections of municipal parkland
have been applied by New York's highest court. The Court of
Appeals in 1871 stated that municipal parkland could not be sold
without legislative authorization,51 in 1920 held that a non-park use
would require similar authorization,5 2 and in 2001 extended the
requirement to a disruption of public access to a park by a non-park
use.

53

A. Sale Of Municipal Parkland
Brooklyn Park Commissioner v. Armstrong54 clearly articulates
public trust protections of municipal parkland by describing the City
as a trustee holding lands for the purpose of public park use. 5 The

50. See Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 95
N.Y.2d 623, 631-32,(2001).
51. See Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234, 243
(1871).
52. See Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E.2d 121, 123 (N.Y. 1920).
53. See Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750
N.E.2d 1050, 1055 (N.Y. 2001).
54. Brooklyn Park Comm'rs, 45 N.Y. at 243.
55. Id. at 243. "It is to be observed that the act of 1861 vested the
lands in the city of Brooklyn forever, but for the uses and purposes
in that act mentioned. Though the city took the title to the lands by
this provision, it took it for the public use as a park, and held it in
trust for that purpose." Id.
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court noted that the City could not sell or convey land held in trust
for public use without legislative sanction. 6
The facts of Brooklyn Park Commissioner are complex. The case
involved a property owner, Armstrong, whose land had increased in
value because it abutted an area planned as Prospect Park." The
City of Brooklyn58 , however, realizing that it had condemned too
much land, tried to sell the small portion near Armstrong's
property. 9 Armstrong, wanting to protect the appreciation of his
land and prevent the sale, bought a lot when the City sold and
refused to take title.6" The City brought suit as a test case, with
defendant Armstrong protesting that the City did not have the power
to sell and convey the title of municipal parkland or to release lien
obligations from bond issues.61 The court relied on precise statutory
interpretation.6"
Initially, the state legislature had authorized
Brooklyn to condemn land for Prospect Park63 and specified that the
City would have fee simple absolute. 64 In 1870 the legislature had
authorized the sale of the small amount of land left over and not
needed for parkland.65 Although the City had clear legislative

. 56. Id. (finding that it was within the power of the legislature to
relieve the city of the trust to sell the land).
57. Id. at 244-45.
58 At the time of the lawsuit Brooklyn was still an independent
city.
59. Id. at 234-36.
60. Id. at 246.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 239. "From the interpretation of the statute itself, then,
must be found the extent of the right of the city in lands taken." Id.
63. Id. at 240-41 (citing 1860 N.Y. Laws 488). The court went
section by section through the statute, finding that it authorized
taking by eminent domain, assessment, and compensation for lands
taken for the public park. Id.
64. Id. at 241-42 (finding that the statutory intent was for the City
to receive full title of fee simple absolute and not an easement).
65. Id. at 243-44 (1870 N.Y. Laws 373). The court found that the
legislature had made a good faith error in overestimating lands
condemned and had no intent to transfer property for profit. Id. See
generally M.M. GRAFF, CENTRAL PARK, PROSPECT PARK, A NEW
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authorization to sell land bought for parkland, ultimately the court
would not allow the sale because of the bond obligations.66
The court in Brooklyn Park Commissioner suggested a rationale
for public trust protections of municipal parkland,67 giving a
fascinating insight into the unprecedented investment in Prospect
Park.68 The process of setting up a public park is seen by the court as
so long and expensive that the public investment must be protected
from private interference.69 Although other municipal parks have not
received the resources of Prospect Park,70 protection of public
investment is still a compelling rationale for requiring limits on what
can be done with parkland. In fact, the only other rationale of park

PERSPECTIVE 107-16 (1985) (recounting controversy over
boundaries for Prospect Park and what land should be used).
66. GRAFF, supra note 65, at 246-48. The court noted that the
legislature had conveyed the authority to sell parkland, but the City
was prevented from doing so because the land had been put up as
security for bonds, and the liens acted as contractual obligations
forcing the City to retain title. Id. The court spends about threequarters of the opinion on the public trust protection issue and only
about one-quarter on the bond obligations. Id.
67. Id. at 239-40.
68. See id. at 111. Prospect Park was intended by Brooklyn to
surpass the famous Central Park that its rival Manhattan was
building. See id. (describing how land for Prospect Park was
purchased in 1860, while construction was delayed by the war); see
also HARNIK, supra note 48, at 11 (stating that 20,000 laborers
worked on Central Park and that the same designers Olmsted and
Vaux designed in Prospect Park a similar "tour de force").
69. Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234, 239-40
(1871).
70. See generally WITOLD RYBCZYNSKI, A CLEARING IN THE
DISTANCE, FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED AND AMERICA IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 184, 269-77 (1999) (recounting the groundbreaking approach taken in establishing Central and Prospect Parks:
to create a perfected or idyllic version of a natural environment, with
huge outlays of labor and capital). In 1859 Central Park was the
largest public works project in the United States. Id. at 184.
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purposes to be offered was articulated by the same court fifty years
later in Williams v. Gallatin.7'

B. Non-Park Uses
In 1920, the New York Court of Appeals extended public trust
protections, barring non-park uses without legislative authorization.72
Whereas Brooklyn Park Commissioners involved sale of parkland,73
the Williams court found that when land remained a public municipal
park but was put to non-park uses, state legislation authorizing the
74
use was also necessary.
It is ironic that Williams v. Gallatin is so often looked to for
guidance on park purposes and uses, since the court actually held
that exhibitions of safety displays was a non-park use. 75 The
Commissioner of Parks for New York City had authorized a ten-year
lease of the Arsenal76 in Central Park to the Safety Institute of

71. 128 N.E. 121, 122-23 (N.Y. 1920).
72. See Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of new York, 750
N.E.2d 1050, 1.054 (N.Y. 2001) (indicating that Williams v. Gallatin
is controlling precedent); see also United States v. City of New
York, 96 F. Supp. 2d 195, 202 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). "The leading New
York Court of Appeals decision is Williams v. Gallatin which held
that, once land has been dedicated to use as a park, it cannot be
diverted for uses other than recreation, in whole or in part,
temporarily or permanently, even for another public use, without
legislative approval." Id. (citations omitted).
73. Brooklyn Park Comm'rs, 45 N.Y. at 235.
74. Williams, 128 N.E. at 122-23.
75. Id. at 123.
76. See BERENSON &'CARROLL, supra note 2, at 19-21. The
Arsenal is an historic building in Central Park. It was built in 184751 as a storage repository for munitions and had been used prior to
1920 as: an arsenal, parks administration, an art gallery, Municipal
Weather Bureau, and a restaurant. Id. It now houses DPR central
administration, the City Parks Foundation, Partnership for Parks, the
Historic House Trust, the Wildlife Conservation Society, a public
gallery for art shows, and a park library. CITY OF N.Y./PARKS &
RECREATION, HISTORICAL SIGN (2000), at http://nycparks.complete
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America for displays of safety devices.7 7 Williams, as a taxpayer,
sued Commissioner Gallatin and the Safety Institute, enjoining issue
of the lease.78 The Court of Appeals reversed the appellate division
and ruled for Williams, agreeing that the proposed use was "foreign
to park purposes."79
The important point in Williams v. Gallatin is that activities with
no connection to park purposes (that is non-park uses) require
"legislative authorization plainly conferred."" The court does not
clearly differentiate between park purposes and uses, but mingles
examples of both in its discussion.8" In divining the meaning of this
influential opinion, it is fair to say that park purposes are the general
aims or goals of public parks, (e.g. recreation, amusement, exercise
or pleasure).8 2 Park uses would logically then be the specific ways
that parkland is employed to meet those goals. The court listed
proper park uses of monuments and aesthetic embellishments, zoos
and horticultural displays, playgrounds and restaurants.83 Non-park
inet.net/sub-your-park/historical-signs.html (last visited Apr. 14,
2002).
77. Williams, 128 N.E. at 121-22. The Safety Institute of
America was incorporated by New York statute in 1911 as a private
corporation with a quasi-public function of improving the public
health and safety through research, education and demonstration. Id.
Terms of the lease included no rent but improvement of the building,
termination if use of the building was required for other park
purposes, and public access to displays. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 121, 123.
80. Id. at 253-54.
81. Id. at 122-23.
82. See id. at 122. "A park is a pleasure ground set apart for
recreation of the public to promote its health and enjoyment." Id. at
123. "[T]o provide means of innocent recreation and refreshment
for the weary mind and body is the purpose of the system of public
parks." Id. The court contrasts the purpose of the Safety Institute of
America as being quite different. Id.
83. Id. at 122-23. Proper park uses are
[M]onuments and buildings of architectural pretension
which attract the eye and divert the mind of the visitor;
floral and horticultural displays, zoological gardens,
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uses such as a court house, or schools would require legislative
authorization.84
Although Williams v.. Gallatin is an influential decision, its
distinctions are neither clear nor easy to apply. Williams appears to
be based on the public trust doctrine, like Brooklyn Park
Commissioner, but the doctrine is not articulated as it was in the
earlier case, leaving the theoretical base vague." The Williams
decision, even in 1920, was not an adequate guide to when state
legislative authorization would be required. For example, the
Williams court did not clarify whether the lease itself was offensive,
or the purposes and uses of the Safety Institute.86 In fact, given the
court's own language, the purposes of the Safety Institute and park
purposes are difficult to distinguish. 8' Today, the court's vision of
park uses and purposes sounds very dated.88 In short, Williams v.
Gallatin does not provide a sufficiently clear statement of park
purposes and uses to direct future judicial and administrative
decisions. It has, however, continued to influence later courts, as
evidenced by Friendsof Van CortlandtPark v. City of New York.89

playing grounds, and even restaurants and rest houses and
many other common incidents of a pleasure ground
contribute to the use and enjoyment of the park. The end
of all such embellishments and conveniences is
substantially the same public good. They facilitate free
public means of pleasure, recreation and amusement and
thus provide for the welfare of the community.
Id.
84. Id. at 122.
85. Id. (citing Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y.
234 (1871) but nowhere does the court mention the public trust).
86. Id. at 121.
87. Id. at 123. Safety Institute purpose is to promote safety and
education about safety and health. Id. Park purposes are general
welfare through pleasure, recreation and amusement and to promote
health. Id. at 123.
88. See supra note 82; see also infra Part II.B. 1.
89. 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 2001) (beginning analysis of
the case with the statement that all parties agree that Williams v.
Gallatinis controlling precedent).
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C. Disruptionof Public ParkAccess by a Non-Park Use

The New York Court of Appeals, relying explicitly on common
law and not statutory authority,9" reinvigorated the public trust
doctrine of earlier cases91 in the recent decision Friends of Van
CortlandtPark v. City of New York.92 The court held that a five-year
disruption of public access to a park recreational facility for
construction of an underground city water treatment plant ("WTP")
was a non-park use requiring state legislative authorization.93 The
court noted that although no title was conveyed and the parkland
would be restored, legislative authorization was required both
because of construction and because of future impacts of the
underground facility.94
Friends of Van Cortlandt Park was the culmination of a long,
contentious process in which the City of New York was caught
between the State, the federal government, and citizens' groups.95 In
90. Id. at 1055. "Finally, we reach this conclusion as a matter of
common law, without the need to address General City Law §
20(2)." Id.
91. Id. at 1053. "In the eighty years since Williams, our courts
have time and again reaffirmed the principle that parkland is
impressed with a public trust [] requiring legislative approval before
it can be alienated or used for an extended period for non-park
purposes." Id. (citations omitted).
92. 750 N.E.2d 1050 (N.Y. 2001).
93. Id. at 1054.
94. Id. at 1054. The court noted as relevant to the decision the
scale of construction, multi-year disruption of access for more than
five years, and inhibition of future uses by aboveground protrusions.
The court also found it unnecessary to consider the questions of any
de minimis exception, or a completely underground facility. Id.
95. See Christopher Rizzo, Comment, Environmental Law &
Justice in New York City, Where a Park is Not Just a Park, 18 PACE
ENvTL. L. REV. 167 (2000) (recounting the history of contention and
introducing some of the scientific issues behind the decision on a
water filter facility); Stephen L. Kass & Jean M. McCarroll,
Alienating Parks: Clean Water v. Recreation, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 28,
2001, at 3 (recounting the history of the case and analyzing the
decisions).
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1992 ihrough 1993, the State Department of Health and the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency had pressured the City to filter
and disinfect 10-30% of the city's water coming from the Croton
Watershed in Westchester, Dutchess, and Putnam Counties.96 Water
from the heavily developed Croton Watershed was determined to
require filtration; water from the Catskill/Delaware Watershed was
allowed to escape filtration, at least for the medium term, with a
watershed protection program.97 In 1997, the federal government
sued the City in federal district court and the State intervened as a
plaintiff.98 A Consent Decree resolving the claims was approved in
1998 and laid out twenty-six compliance milestones for the City to
obtain permits and construct a WTP.99 The City went through the

96. United States v. City of New York, 96 F. Supp. 2d 195, 198
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (describing the pressure that New York City is
under based on Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1;
Surface Water Treatment Rule, 40 C.F.R. §§ 141.70-.75; and a state
sanitary code similar to federal requirements); see also Michael
Cooper, With Reservoirs Low, Mayor Plans to Issue Drought
Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at B3; Andrew C. Revkin, In
Drought, Fears of a Dry Future, Planners Worry About Water
Supply in the Long Term, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, at 29
(describing conflicts over water from the Delaware river and
strategies to reduce city dependence). During times of drought
Croton water becomes more important because reservoir water from
the Delaware watershed to the northwest may be required to
maintain flow volume in the Delaware River. Id.
97. The heavily developed Croton watershed has about 250,000
people in 375 square miles, whereas the Catskill/Delaware
watershed has 125,000 in about 1,600 square miles. See Joel A.
Miele Sr., An Enormous Amount of Work to be Done: Protecting the
New York City Watershed, 12 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 467, 474
(2002); Marc A. Yaggi, Impervious Surfaces in the New York City
Watershed, 12 FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J. 489, 491-92 (2002).
98. See Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750

N.E.2d 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 2001). The Federal government sued for
violation of Federal law. "The State intervened as plaintiff, alleging
noncompliance with the State Sanitary Code." Id.
99. United States v. City of New York, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 199-200
(describing the Consent Decree, which lays out compliance dates for
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site selection process and chose Mosholu Golf Course in Van
Cortlandt Park in the Bronx.' ° The City wrote reports evaluating
sites, had public hearings, went through the environmental review
and city zoning process, and received approval from the City
Planning Commission and the City Council.01 The City, however,
did not seek state legislative authorization for building a twentythree acre WTP underneath a popular public golf course or for
closing it for the five or more year period of construction.'0 2
The suit by the State Attorney General was joined by two citizens'
suits °3 . The complaints in United States v. City of New York relied
on "the common law doctrine against alienation of parkland," which
indicates that "parkland in the state may not be diverted to any uses
that are not recreational or otherwise consistent with the public use
and enjoyment of a park ...[i]n the absence of specific approval by
the State Legislature."'0 4 The City answered that the construction of
the WTP was not an alienation because, there was no conveyance of
property interest, and the WTP would be built underground and the
park restored on top of it, with any disruption being temporary.01 5
The district court, distinguishing the facts from Williams v. Gallatin,
agreed with the City that no state legislation was necessary because
no land was to be transferred, the public would have undiminished
use after restoration, any change in grade of soil was unimportant,
selecting a site, permits, obtaining legislative authorization,
environmental review, construction and operation).
100. Id. at 200.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 198, 201.
103. Id. at 198. Actions originally brought in Bronx County
Supreme Court "under Article 78 of the New York CPLR and for
declaratory and injunctive relief' against the City's selection of the
Mosholu Golf Course. Id. at 198, 201. The State Attorney General
and citizens' groups all asserted that the City had not met the
obligations of the Consent Decree by not obtaining state legislative
approval. Id. One of the citizen groups argued in addition that a
zoning change was needed and that the city agency approvals were
invalid. Id.
104. Id. at 201. The plaintiffs also relied on sections 20(2) and
20(7) of the General City Law. Id.
105. Id. at 201-02.
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and underground use and temporary disruption were permissible if
future use was for park purposes. 1°6 The district court dismissed the
Attorney General's claim and granted summary judgment for the
07
City. 1
The plaintiffs' appeals were consolidated and heard by the Second
Circuit Court, which granted a motion by the plaintiffs to certify as a
state law question "the park alienation issue or public trust issue."' '
The New York Court of Appeals accepted certification of the
question whether any aspect of the WTP required state legislative
approval. 9 In an opinion by Chief Justice Kaye, the court ruled
unanimously that legislative approval was required because of the
multi-year disruption and interference with future park use." 0
The two opinions, United States v. City of New York from the
federal district court and Friends of Van Cortlandt Park from the
Court of Appeals, illustrate that the same set of facts and case law
can lead to very different opinions on when state legislative
authorization is required."'
Whereas the federal district court
followed the City in downplaying disruption of public park access,"'

106. Id. at 202-04; see also Kass & McCarroll, supra note 95, at 3
(analyzing the district court opinion).
107. United States v. City of New York, 96 F. Supp. 2d 195, 209
(E.D.N.Y. 2000).
108. Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 232 F.3d
324, 327 (2d Cir. 2000) (allowing certification because the parties
contentions "frame a substantial issue on which the law of New
York is not clear," which involved important public interest issues,
and because the State and City were on opposite sides on a
controversy of state law).
109. Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750
N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 2001).
110. Id. at 630-31. The City was now in the difficult position of
having been taken to court to stop the construction of a WTP that it
had been taken to court to force to construct. Id.
111. See Kass & McCarroll, supra note 95, at 3 (pointing out how
opposing parties characterized the facts very differently).
112. United States v. City of New York, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 201-02
(noting that the WTP would: affect 28 of 1,146 park acres, reduce
total open space ratio from 26 to 23 acres per 1000 residents when
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the Court of Appeals accepted the Friends of Van Cortlandt Park
and Attorney General's argument that maximized the negatives of
the large construction project.113
Although both courts cited
Williams' protections against parkland alienation," 4 the federal
district court dismissed them as irrelevant to an underground
municipal facility.' ' The Court of Appeals, however, based its
decision that legislative authorization was required to a large extent
on Williams restrictions against non-park uses in parkland." 6 In fact,
the result was almost a foregone conclusion with the court's
assumptions that the WTP was a non-park use" 7 that would
negatively impact public use of an important recreational facility at a
very large scale."'
The history and controversy surrounding Friends of Van Cortlandt
Park underscore that Williams is simply not an adequate guide in the
twenty-first century to what are proper park uses, as distinct from
non-park uses requiring state enabling legislation. While the Court

minimum is 2.5, remove 268 trees, and rebuild and restore the park
so that use would be unaffected with the facility underground).
113. Friends of Van Cortlandt Park, 750 N.E.2d at 1051-52
(listing the effects of the project which would disrupt public use:
total closure of the only city public golf course directly accessible by
subway for more than five years, construction of a 473,000 square
foot industrial facility that would protrude up to thirty feet above
ground, filtering 290 million gallons of water and producing 61 tons
of sludge waste every day, removal of a million cubic yards of fill,
destruction of rare vegetation, influx of over 1,000 workers and
hundreds of heavy construction vehicles, as well as unspecified
impact on future use).
114. Id. at 1053 (beginning with the remark that Williams v.
Gallatinis controlling precedent).
115. United States v. City of New York, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 202-03
(finding Williams irrelevant to construction of an underground
facility when there is no transfer of parkland and no diminution of
public use).
116. Friendsof Van CortlandtPark, 750 N.E.2d at 1054.
117. Id. at 1055.
118. Id. at 1054-55.
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of Appeals flatly assumed that a WTP was a non-park use,119 the
federal district court had seen the WTP as an "essential public
service" underneath the park.1 21 Williams, of course, talks of
monuments, horticulture, zoos, playgrounds and other delights of
recreation and amusement.' 2 ' While Williams may stand for the
proposition that non-park uses should not be allowed without state
authorization, it was not an adequate guide to proper park uses in
1920, and it is even less so now.

II. COMMON LAW PUBLIC TRUST PROTECTIONS ARE
IMPORTANT BUT NOT SUFFICIENT

A. Common Law Public Trust Requirements of State Legislative
Authorization Are a SignificantBarrierto Alienation 22 of Parkland
The public trust doctrine is important as a protection of parkland,
but it is not sufficient. While the process of obtaining state
legislative authorization for a proposal often takes a year to
complete, it does hold decision makers accountable to community
opinion in a rough way. Regulatory requirements for environmental
review or zoning changes present procedural barriers that can cause
delay and expense, but are not answerable to citizens of affected
communities. Although common law may not generally be viewed
as making decision makers responsive to community and voter
wishes, the particular requirements of public trust protections are a
starting point, foundation, or indication of what is needed.
Existing common law park protections are not sufficient first and
foremost because they lack clear definitions of park purposes and
uses. They do not address the existing range of contractual activities

119. Id. at 1055. Kass & McCarroll, supra note 95, at 3. Pointing
out that the Court of Appeals was very influenced by the facts of the
case, which showed a considerable intrusion on parkland for nonpark use, although by another city agency for a beneficial public
purpose. Id.
120. United States v. City of New York, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 202.
121. Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 122-23 (N.Y. 1920); see
also supra notes 81-85, and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 38 (defining alienation).
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in parks. They have been ignored, creating bad precedent and preexisting conflicting uses. Finally, they do not adequately define
what is and is not a park.
1. The Process of State Legislative Authorization
Often Takes a Year to Complete
Great ramifications flow from a determination that a proposed
activity is a non-park use since the process of obtaining state
legislative authorization often takes at least a year, and can be
blocked by opposition among the local community and their
legislators.123 Other regulatory and administrative requirements may
further delay the project and increase the cost, but do not make a
proposed activity dependant on support from the local community. 24
'
The process of introducing an alienation bill authorizing a nonpark use and getting approval by both bodies of the state legislature
takes six to nine months if all goes smoothly and more than a year if
complications arise.125 Based on case law and custom, authorizing
123. See Tina Kelley, City to Consider Two Sites for Plant to Filter
Water, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001, at D3 (reporting that the City had
identified two other sites for a WTP, and suggesting that passage of
approval by the state legislature for the Van Cortlandt Park site was
"highly unlikely" in such a contentious battle); see also infra note
125.
124. See discussion infra this Part II.A. 1.
125. Interview with Alison Wenger, Director of Government
Relations, Department of Parks and Recreation, in New York, N.Y.
(July 23, 2001). The process followed by the City of New York
Department of Parks and Recreation is as follows:
1) Every year by the beginning of September the agency's
legislative agenda is due to the Mayor's Legislative Coordinating
Committee.
2) For state legislation authorizing park alienation, a draft of the
legislative bill and a memo of support must be submitted to the
Mayor's Office of State Legislative Affairs (part of the Office of
Intergovernmental Affairs).
3) The draft bill must be sponsored in the legislature by the local
senator and assemblyperson. It is introduced by the sponsors, given
a date and identifying numbers for the House and Assembly, and
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bills should be as specifically drawn as possible. 26 In general, the
state encourages substitution of equivalent land (based on acreage or
market value) for discontinued parkland.'27 When parkland is used
by a municipality for another purpose, it should specify replacement
for the alienated land, or set aside equivalent funds for capital park
28
improvements.
2. Local Community Opposition Can Prevent State Legislative
Authorization of Non-Park Uses
Although there is no explicit requirement for local community
support to authorize non-park uses, it is effectively very difficult to
obtain state legislative authorization without it. First, the bill must
be accompanied by a "Home Rule Request" from the local

assigned to a committee (the Committee on Cities or the Committee
on Local Government).
4) A Home Rule Request must be obtained from the local
legislature. The resolution of the New York City Council and memo
of support from the New York City Mayor are necessary for the bill
to move beyond committee.
5) The bill must be passed by both the Senate and Assembly.
6) The authorizing bill must also be signed by the governor within
sixty to ninety days.
126. N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF PARKS, RECREATION, & HISTORIC
PRESERVATION, GUIDE TO THE ALIENATION OR CONVERSION OF
MUNICIPAL PARKLANDS 8-9 (1990) [hereinafter STATE GUIDE TO
ALIENATION].

127. See id. at 8. It is the policy of State Office of Parks,
Recreation and Historic Preservation to encourage substitution of

parkland; requirement cannot be waived for parkland funded by state
bonds. Id.

128. See, e.g., 1998 N.Y. Laws 497 (authorizing discontinuance of
a small portion of Verdi Park in Manhattan taken by the 72nd Street
subway station expansion in exchange for replacement land and
improvements);

1994 N.Y. Laws 341 (authorizing Waverly in

Franklin County to use parklands for a sewage line easement on
condition that the ground surface be restored for park use and
consideration paid for park improvements).
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legislature and a Memo of Support from the local executive. 29
Second, the bill must be supported by the local senator and
assemblyperson.'30 Third, the bill must be passed by both the Senate
and the Assembly.' 3 ' Public support for extremely unpopular uses
will be difficult to get from politicians with a vocal constituency.
The proposed WTP in Van Cortlandt Park demonstrates that a
controversial use of parkland can meet all the regulatory
requirements but not garner the political support necessary to pass a
bill through the state legislature.'32 From 1990 to 2000 the New
York legislature has passed less than twenty bills each year
authorizing park alienations.' 33
3. Regulatory Requirements for Alienating Park Uses Are More
Procedural and Less Responsive to Public Opinion Than Obtaining
State Legislative Authorization
Environmental review as well as land use/zoning review will be
necessary to execute a transfer of municipal parkland in most cases,
34
even if legislative authorization is successfully obtained.
Environmental review by the agency responsible for sponsoring or
permitting is mandated by the State Environmental Quality Review
Act ("SEQRA"),'35 and, in the city, City Environmental Quality
129. Interview with Alison Wenger, supra note 125. In New York
City, this would mean a Home Rule Request from the City Council
and a Memo of Support from the mayor.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Kelley, supra note 123.
133. See N.Y. PARKS REC. & HIST. PRESERV. LAWS Index
(McKinney 1990) (statutes for park discontinuance, transfer,
easements, sale, deaccession, and imposition of admission fees).
134. See STATE GUIDE TO ALIENATION, supra note 126, at 5
(noting that a legislative action only gives authorization but does not
accomplish a transfer).
135. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney
2002) (codified at N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.10.20 (2000)); see Mobil Oil Corp. v. City of Syracuse Indus. Dev.
Agency, 646 N.Y.S.2d 741, 747-48 (App. Div. 1996) (holding that
under SEQRA environmental review must be carried out by the
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Review ("CEQR") 36 . In New York City, proposed changes in the

zoning map trigger the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure
("ULURP"),'37 and siting of city facilities is subject to review under

the Fair Share criteria.'38 At least in New York City, a ULURP
application is necessary for transfer of parkland,'39 and a ULURP
application will not go through without the necessary environmental
review.140 A plaintiff challenging the sufficiency of regulatory
determination is unlikely to prevail. 4 ' If a plaintiff does prevail, it
will likely be on procedural grounds and not because of community
opposition.142

agency responsible for undertaking, funding, or approving an action
and reciting the necessary standard that the agency take a "hard
look" at areas of environmental concern).
136. New York City Charter ch. 8, § 192-e (2001); NEW YORK,
N.Y., 62 R.C.N.Y. ch. 5 (2001) (CEQR rules of procedure); DEP'T
OF

CITY'

PLANNING,

RULES

OF

PROCEDURE

FOR

CITY

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REvIEW (1991) (prepared under Mayor
Dinkins and the New York City Planning Commission); CITY OF
NEW YORK, CITY ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW TECHNICAL

(1993) [hereinafter CEQR TECHNICAL MANUAL].
137. New York City Charter ch. 8, § 197-c (2001); NEW YORK,
N.Y., 62 R.C.N.Y. chs. 2, 6 (2001).
138. New York City Charter ch. 8, § 203 (2001) (listing criteria for
location of city facilities); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 6, app. A (2001).
139. See New York City Charter ch. 8, § 197-c (2001) (ULURP
required for change in city map or zoning map, conversions in land
use; sale, lease, or purchase of city property; or a zoning variance).
MANUAL

140. See DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING, UNIFORM LAND USE REVIEW

PROCEDURE 3 (1990) (ULURP application will not be certified as
complete unless necessary environmental review has been done).
141. See Michael B. Gerard, Ten Years of SEQRA Litigation: A
StatisticalAnalysis, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 24, 2000, at 3 [hereinafter "Ten
Years of SEQRA"] (reporting ten to twenty-eight percent of 635
S.E.Q.R.A. cases where plaintiffs won; and based on the substantive
legal issues, five of forty-one CEQR cases, four of fifty-six ULURP
decisions, and one of eleven Fair Share decisions).
142. See id.
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a. EnvironmentalReview
SEQRA and CEQR require that a proposed action be assessed for
its effect on the environment.'43
The purpose is to force
consideration of possible environmental effects of a proposed action
early in the process.'"A "Type II Action" is defined as having less
significant environmental impact and thus not requiring intensive
study. 45 'Type I Actions" are likely to require an exhaustive study
of environmental impact and alternatives in an Environmental
143. The following are indicators of significant adverse
environmental impact:
i)
substantial adverse change in air quality, water
quality or quantity, traffic, noise, solid waste production,
erosion, flooding, leaching, drainage;
ii) removal or destruction of large quantities of flora or
fauna, substantial impacts on species or habitat
iii) impairment of Critical Environmental Area
iv) conflict with community goals
v)
impairment of important historical or aesthetic
resources or existing community and neighborhood
character
vi) major change in quantity or type of energy
vii) creation of hazard to human health
viii)substantial change in land use
ix) attracting large numbers of people
x-xii)actions which would indirectly result in listed
significant impacts
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS tit. 6, § 617.7(c) (2001).
144. See Scenic Hudson, Inc. v. Town of Fishkill Town Bd., 685
N.Y.S.2d 777, 780 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (holding that the purpose of
SEQRA was to bring in evaluation of environmental impacts early in
the decision and annulling a town zoning decision that did not
consider environmental impacts).
145. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.5(a) (2001). State
Type II Actions listed include maintenance or repair, agricultural
practices, small construction projects, minor temporary land uses,
ministerial acts, and actions of the legislature and governor but not
actions of local legislatures. City Type II Actions are similar.
CEQR TECHNICAL MANUAL, supra note 136, at 1-2, 1-3.
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Impact Statement ("EIS").146 An Environmental Assessment Form is

used to determine the significance of a Type I or Unlisted Action and
whether an EIS is required.147 The EIS examines the impact of a
proposed action on various factors with a projected baseline without
the action, as well as alternatives to the action.48

146. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. § 617.4 (2001). State
Type I Actions listed include: adoption of a municipality's land use
plan, zoning changes affecting twenty-five acres or more, land
transfer of a state agency over a hundred acres, construction over set
limits, structures over a certain height when there is no zoning in
place, certain non-agricultural uses in agricultural area, actions
affecting historic preservation landmarks, actions that exceed certain
thresholds. Id. City Type I Actions are similar, with the addition of
thresholds for institutions and major office centers.
CEQR
TECHNICAL MANUAL, supra note 136, at 1-2, 1-3; see also Scenic
Hudson, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (finding that SEQRA requires an EIS
whenever authorization is given for an action that may have
significant environmental impact).
147. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6 § 617.6 (2001; CEQR
TECHNICAL MANUAL, supra note 136, at 1-3; see also Omni Partners
L.P. v. County of Nassau, 654 N.Y.S.2d 824, 826 (Sup. Ct. 1997)
(finding that when an Environmental Assessment for an upgrading
of athletic facilities showed significant environmental impact
possible that a full impact statement should be prepared and
overturning
the
county
planning
commission
negative
determination). An EIS is required presumptively by a listed Type I
action or when an EAF results in a positive determination. Id.
148. See, e.g., CEQR TECHNICAL MANUAL, supra note 136, at

Table of Contents. Factors examined include land use, zoning, and
public policy; socioeconomic conditions; community facilities and
services; open space; shadows; cultural resources; urban design,
visual resources; neighborhood character; natural resources;
hazardous
materials;
Waterfront
Revitalization
Program;
infrastructure; solid waste and sanitation; energy; traffic and parking;
transit and pedestrians; air quality; noise; construction impacts; and
alternatives. Id.
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Although the process of environmental review includes public
comment and a hearing,' 49 community opposition will not
necessarily stop a proposed project. 5 ° In fact, the party proposing a
project is the one that assembles the data and writes the EIS. The
lead agency determination of environmental impact and written
findings may incorporate public comment but is not bound by it.
Agency determinations can be challenged in court as "arbitrary and
capricious or an abuse of discretion","' limited by a four month
statute of limitations.' 52 Courts usually defer to administrative
agency determinations in environmental review challenges.'53
149. See, e.g. id. at 1-12. The lead agency solicits public
comments for the scoping of critical issues and reviewing the draft
EIS. Id.
150. See, e.g., United States v. City of New York, 96 F. Supp. 2d
195, 200 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (recounting how public comments and
hearings were held for SEQRA, CEQR, and ULURP in the
consideration of the Van Cortlandt Park WTP and reporting that
despite numerous critical comments, approvals were granted); cf.
Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,
223, 227-28 (1980) (holding that federal environmental review did
not impose substantive requirements but mandated that agencies
follow the procedural steps).
151. See, e.g., Cathedral Church of Saint John the Divine v.
Dormitory Auth. of the State of N.Y., 645 N.Y.S.2d 637, 640 (App.
Div. 1996). The appeals court reviewed a SEQR Declaration of
Negative Impact by the respondent state agency for an expanded
nursing home facility next to city land that the petitioner claimed
was a park. Id. at 639. The review of the issuance of a negative
impact statement was an Article 78 proceeding. The proper standard
of review was "whether the determination was arbitrary and
capricious or an abuse of discretion." Id. at 640. The court affirmed
the agency determination that no EIS was required. Id.
152. See Douglaston and Little Neck Coalition v. Sexton, 535
N.Y.S.2d 634, 635-36 (App. Div. 1988) (rejecting because the fourmonth statute of limitations had expired an Article 78 claim that
SEQRA and ULURP reviews were deficient). See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §
217 (McKinney 2001).
153. See Michael B. Gerrard, A Review of 2000 SEQRA Cases,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 23, 2001, at 3 (reporting that the Court of Appeals
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Statutes of limitations are commonly a successful defense to
challenges of environmental review by plaintiffs.154 Traditionally,
plaintiffs were environmentalists challenging a completed review in
order to stop or delay a project. '55 In an interesting change,
applicants or developers of proposed projects are starting to come to
courts to overturn adverse agency determinations."5 6
b. Land Use Review
A ULURP application must be submitted to the City of New York
Department of City Planning for a change in land use, including sale
of parkland or use for a non-park purpose.'57 Although the New
consistently rules for government defendants in SEQRA cases)
[hereinafter Review of 2000 SEQRA Cases].
154. See id. (statute of limitations often used to defeat plaintiffs'
claims).
155. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Unites States Army Corps of
Engineers, 701 F.2d 1011, 1016, 1029-33 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding
that an environmental review document was inadequate in a case
brought by citizen and environmental activists). The ensuing delay
ultimately meant that the proposed "Westway" high-speed road was
not built along the west shore of Manhattan. See ROBERT V.
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION; LAW, SCIENCE,

POLICY 896 (2000) (noting that the resulting delay from the
injunction of this decision led to abandonment of the Westway). But
cf. Adam Nagourney, A Ghost of Westway Rises Along the Hudson,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002, at 33 (suggesting that the Westway might
have been environmentally beneficial and that similar plans are
being once again proposed). The Westway would have put a highspeed road along the Hudson shore with a park promenade built on
top. Id. The article points out that opponents of the Westway
overcame one New York mayor, two governors, and three
presidents, as well as the promise of $1.7 billion in federal funds. Id.
156. See Review of 2000 SEQRA Cases, supra note 153 (plaintiffs
in year 2000 SEQRA cases included project applicants and not just
environmentalists opposed to projects).
AND

157. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF PARKS, RECREATION &
HISTORIC PRES., supra note 40 at 1. ULURP review is triggered by:

a change in the city map or zoning map, conversions in land use,
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York City ULURP process opens a proposed project to review by
the public and the local community board, their opposition cannot
halt a project because ultimate authorization is dependant on
approval by the City Planning Commission, the City Council and the
Mayor."18 In ULURP review of a city project, the city is reviewing
an action proposed by one of its own agencies and denial would be
unlikely. As with environmental review, trends of the last decade
show that about ten percent of plaintiffs contesting ULUPR
decisions prevail.159 Rulings of ULURP appeals reported have
turned on procedural questions such as whether ULURP applied to
the action and whether procedural rules were followed.16 ° Siting of
city facilities also triggers the Fair Share criteria.16"'
In the reorganization of New York City government in 1989,
criteria were set up to encourage consideration of equity issues in
siting of city facilities. 6 ' Fair Share review by the Department of
platting of streets, special permits, capital projects; and sale, lease or
purchase of City real property, or granting of a zoning variance. Id.
Because parkland is not mapped with a zoning designation, use for
another purpose would trigger the ULURP process. New York City
Zoning Resolution art. 1, § 11-13 (1974).
158. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF PARKS, RECREATION & HISTORIC
PRES., supra note 40, at 12-13. The Mayor appoints the Director of
the Planning Commission and also can exercise a vote in the
ULURP decision. The public can make comments and the local
community
board
and
borough
president
can
make
recommendations. Id. The City Council does have an opportunity
to vote on every ULURP application. But if no City Council action
is taken within fifty days, the Planning Commission decision stands.
1.
159. See Ten Years of SEQRA, supra note 141, at 3. Although
total prevailing plaintiffs may be higher, only ten percent involved
consideration of the ULURP. Id.
160. See id. (showing examples of four cases where plaintiffs won,
out of fifty-six reported decisions, which turned on whether ULURP
applied).
161 See infra note 166.
162. New York City Charter ch. 8, §§ 203, 204.
The criteria shall be designed to further the fair
distribution among communities of the burdens and
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.City Planning has only affected about 800 facilities in ten years.'63
The Fair Share criteria are procedures, not requirements, to help
balance spending, program needs and geographic distribution of
facilities."6 During the period 1990 to 1999 only one Fair Share
consideration was successfully challenged.'65 Whether Fair Sharetype considerations of environmental justice will have to be included
in an environmental review is still unsettled.166
B. Existing Common Law Public Trust ParkProtectionsare Not
Sufficient
Public trust protections of New York parks add ah essential
requirement that prohibits non-park uses without state legislative
approval. Not only is obtaining the state authorization an onerous
process, but it is one that can be stopped by vigorous community
opposition.'67 Public trust protections are limited, however, by
unclear definitions of park purposes and uses, a failure to address the
full range of contractual arrangements, and the fact that the public
benefits associated with city facilities, consistent with
community needs for services and efficient and cost
effective delivery of services and with due regard for the
social and economic impacts of such facilities upon the
areas surrounding the sites.
Id § 203. See generally David Karnovsky, Fair Share: New York
City's Experiment in Equitable Siting of City Facilities and Its
Relationship to EnvironmentalJustice, 13 ENvTL. L. IN N.Y. 37-44
(2002) (describing the history of the city's Fair Share Criteria and
analyzing it with an environmental justice analysis).
163. Barbara Weisberg, Assistant Executive Director, Department
of City Planning, Comments made at Fordham University School of
Law (Oct. 31, 2001).
164. See Karnovsky, supra note 162, at 39 (pointing out that the
author Charter Revision Commission had a goal of procedural
fairness rather than uniform geographic distribution).
165. See Ten Years of SEQRA, supra note 141, at 3.
166. See Karnovsky, supra note 162, at 43-44 (examining
challenges for an environmental justice analysis similar to Fair Share
under SEQRA).
167. See supra Part II.A.
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trust requirements have at times been ignored.168 In addition, roads
and parks together and modern changes in funding structures have
acted to confuse the jurisdiction of public trust protections.'69
Central Park illustrates the changing conceptions of park function.
1. Common Law Does Not Articulate Proper Park Purposes
Conceptions of the purposes or functions of parks have expanded
over time among both those who administer and those who use
parks. 7 ° Central Park is possibly the first consciously designed
public green space. Prior public plazas were city structures,
although gardens had been private spaces. 7 ' The original rural
pastoral landscape 7 ' sought by its designers before the Civil War,
was by 1900 was overtaken by a park that was a "pleasure ground",
site of carousels, zoos, and horse-trotting.'73 Increasingly, in the
twentieth century, the idea of a park as a place for active recreation
took hold.174 From the 1960s on, multiple visions of the functions of
76
parks have competed and coexisted: 75 rural pastoral landscape art,'
168. See supra Part II.B.4.
169. See supra Part II.B.5.
170. See, e.g., ROY ROSENZWEIG & ELIZABETH BLACKMAR, THE
PARK AND THE PEOPLE, A HISTORY OF CENTRAL PARK 493, 497,
512-13 & 518-19 (1992) (recounting recent history of Central Park,
evolution of commissioners' concepts of park purposes and park
uses allowed).
171. See 19 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 659 (1994)
(claiming that Central Park was the first "designed public green
space").
172. See ROSENZWEIG & BLACKMAR, supra note 170, at 142
(describing the goal of Central Park designers Calvert Vaux and
Frederic Law Olmsted in 1857).
173. See id. at 366, 374, 387 (recounting amusements encroaching
in Central Park and competing visions of the purpose of the park).
174. See id. at 392-95 (beginnings of popular active recreation in
parks started with playgrounds).
175. See id. at 491-93 (listing three DPR commissioners and
curator of the 1960s with differing ideas on park purposes).
176. See id. (pastoral park original conception of park designers
endorsed by curator Henry Hope Reed).
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eclectic pleasure garden,'77 progressive recreational park,'78
commons for political discourse and social organizing,' 79 nature
conservation and restoration, 8 ° and even site of social programs for
the disadvantaged. 8 ' Allowable park uses are a direct function of
the purpose which parks are assumed to provide. 8 2 Unfortunately,
changing conceptions of park purposes are not reflected in common
"'
If New York courts are relying only on Williams v. Gallatin
law. 83
as a definition of park purposes, then only one view of park purposes
is being used as a basis for consideration.
a. Rural PastoralLandscapeArt
Central Park in Manhattan was created as "perfected nature" in the
English tradition,8 4 a place to uplift the spirit and improve the
senses.'85 The park was seen as a tangible manifestation of and way
177. See id. (the pleasure garden was endorsed by commissioners
Hoving & Hekscher).
178. See id. (progressive recreation view of commissioner Robert
Moses).
179. See id. at 497 (Mayor Lindsay forced park commissioner in
1967 to allow large antiwar demonstration).
180. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
181. See infra note 212.
182. If active recreation is the purpose, then areas designated as
ball fields may be desirable uses. If nature conservation is the
purpose for an area, then a ball field may be considered an
encroachment.'
183. See Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750
N.E.2d 1050, 1053-54 (N.Y. 2001) (relying almost exclusively on
Williams in discussing park purposes and non-park uses).
184. See RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 70, at 86-87, 121, 161. Calvert
Vaux, who handled the structure, was English and Frederic Law
Olmsted, who designed the landscape, had been greatly influenced in
his ideas about landscaping by a visit to England. Id.
185. See ROSENZWEIG & BLACKMAR, supra note 170, at 5, 104,
107-08 (discussing initial conceptions of Central Park's function as
landscape art that would reveal the hand of God in nature, a
symbolic statement of "shared civic goals," and a rural tranquil
"Eden").
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to advance democracy: the government was physically supporting
culture and the arts, and providing a place for all citizens of all
classes.'8 6 Art and design of the entire landscape were calculated to
achieve the function of the restful rural pastoral retreat in the city.'87
The Olmstedian'88 vision underlies the assumption of what a park
should do in Brooklyn ParkComm'rs. 89
b. PleasureGround
The vision of park as eclectic pleasure ground has competed with
the rural pastoral approach since the beginning of formal park
design.'9 ° A park as pleasure garden functions to provide amusement
and diversion and produce profits by attracting crowds with:
ornamental gardens, grottoes, fountains, stages, circuses, carousels,
concerts, theater, fireworks, and inspirational statues. 9 ' Williams v.
Gallatin could not have provided a better description of the park as
pleasure ground.'92 Clearly, if a park is assumed to function as a
pleasure ground, monuments, floral displays, zoos, playgrounds,
186. See id. at 136-39 (describing Vaux and Olmsted's slightly
differing conceptions of how to manifest democracy in the public
park).
187. See 9 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 156 (1994)
(describing the original park concept as a romantic green open space
to escape from the industrialized city to more healthful open air).
"The primary purpose was to provide passive recreation-walking
and taking the air in agreeable surroundings reminiscent of the
unspoiled country." Id.
188. See HARNIK, supra note 48, at 3 (calling Olmsted the father of
landscape architecture and emphasizing his view of the importance
of city parks).
189. Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234, 239-40
(1871) (describing the work and expense in altering and improving
the natural processes of the landscape).
190. See ROSENZWEIG & BLACKMAR, supra note 170, at 104
(characterizing "popular eclecticism" as an early competing vision of
how Central Park should function).
191. See id. (listing uses proposed by advocates of the park as
profit-generating pleasure garden).
192. See Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 122 (N.Y. 1920).
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restaurants and rest houses are in,' 93 but displays of safety devices to
lessen the number of casualties and avoid physical suffering and
premature death are out.'94 As rentals and rides, concerts and
carousels, 95 franchises and food, 96 museums, 197 zoos 1 98 and a
casino' 99 were added to Central Park in the nineteenth century, active
recreation began to emerge as a function of parks. °°
c. Center of Active Recreation
It was only in the 1880's that tennis, football, bicycling, baseball
and other active and competitive sports were allowed in Central
Park.20 ' Earlier park policies had discouraged organized sports as
being incompatible with the rural pastoral ideal of enjoying nature.20 2
However, in the twentieth century, parks began to be seen as a
playground.0 3 The first playgrounds were built after 1910, and by
the 1920s Manhattan had almost a hundred.2" The real expansion of
parks and parklands in New York City, was during Robert Moses'
tenure as park commissioner from 1934 to 1960.05 Moses was able
to accomplish his massive construction and rehabilitation campaign

193. See id. The Court of Appeals in Williams lists these park
uses. See supra note 82 and text accompanying.
194. See Williams, 128 N.E. at 123.
195. See ROSENZWEIG & BLACKMAR, supra note 170, at 309 (boat
rentals, pony rides, concerts, sail boats, carousel).
196. See id. at 315.
197. See id. at 357.
198. See id. at 345.
199. See id. at 399.
200. See id. at 312 (relating how active sports began to be allowed
in parks).
201. See id.
202. See id. at 251.
203. See id. at 392-93 (recounting how this view was led by
progressive reformers promoting play programs for children).
204. Id.
205. See ROBERT CARO, THE POWER BROKER 7 (1975)
(enumerating 777 playgrounds, 288 tennis courts, and 673 baseball
diamonds built during Moses' tenure).
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because of huge infusions of New Deal federal money. 2 6 To a large
extent, the infrastructure that Moses put in place constrains today's
park functions.
d. Social and PoliticalCommons
Although the notion that parks functioned as a common area for
political discourse was suggested earlier,2 °7 the 1960s forced a
reassessment of park function. 08 Antiwar protests and civil rights
demonstrations were allowed in Central Park, causing a
reconsideration of park policy. 29 There was great debate as well
about whether parks should function as a place for cultural festivals
and public concerts.21 ° Park functions in the 1960s came to include
providing a commons for social expression and experimentation, as
well as the pre-existing rural pastoral landscape, pleasure garden,21
212
and center for recreation.

206. See ROSENZWEIG & BLACKMAR, supra note 170, at 372
(reciting the money and accomplishments during just Moses' first
year as commissioner in 1934).
207 See id. at 314-15, 391 (political functions in parks limited to
labor picnics in Central Park as well as athletic/patriotic/historical
pageants).
208. See id. at 489.
209. See id. at 495-97 (describing the conflict between Mayor
Lindsay's efforts to open parks for gatherings and the park
commissioner's goal of providing a pleasure garden for residents).
210. See id. at 499-501.
211. See id. at 493-95 (describing Central Park events such as
love-ins, be-ins, paint-ins, yippie gatherings, as well as freer sexual
expression and counterculture activities; as well as describing the
1966 Central Park curator as being dedicated to Olmstead vision and
pleasure garden concept).
212. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra not 49. In 2001 the
DPR lists facilities in New York City of 614 ball fields, 991
playgrounds, 660 tennis courts, 33 outdoor swimming pools, 10
indoor swimming pools, 35 recreation centers, beaches 13 golf
courses, 4 major stadium, and 4 zoos. Id.
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e. Nature Conservation and Social Programs
After the 1970s, additional park functions have been added to the
list. Environmental awareness of the natural resources of parks led
to the important perceived functions of conservation and
restoration." 3 Parks are starting to be seen by administrators and
citizens as a way to preserve habitat and ecological systems." 4 Rare,
endangered, and threatened species of plants have become important
denizens in today's parks." |5 In addition, in New York City, the
park system has provided social program functions, especially in
education." 6 Whereas monuments had always been common in
parks and were an accepted use under the pleasure ground approach,
the use of parkland as a setting for conceptual or performance art has

213. See Kirk Johnson, Return of the Natives: Playing God in the
Fields, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2000, at 37 (describing Project X, an
ecological restoration effort of the city DPR to replace invasive
introduced plants with native ones). In 1984, the New York City
Department of Parks and Recreation started a special unit, the
Natural Resources Group ("NRG"), for conservation purposes. The
NRG has programs to support natural resource protection of highquality natural areas in parks. See NATURAL RES. GROUP, supra
note 45.
214. Henry J. Stem, The Politics and Science of Managing New
York City's Emerald Empire: Sustaining Our City's Ecosystem in
Blue Skies and Gray Clouds, in SCI. IN SOC'Y POL'Y REP. 13-17

DPR habitat restoration goals and
(1999)
(describing
accomplishments).
215. See NATURAL RESOURCES GROUP, CITY OF N.Y. PARKS &
RECREATION, THE RARE PLANT PROPAGATION PROJECT (2001)
(describing efforts since 1984 for "protection, acquisition and
restoration of the City's diverse natural resources").
216. See CITY OF N.Y. PARKS & RECREATION, BIENNIAL REPORT
35-40 (2001) [hereinafter DPR BIENNIAL REPORT] (listing after-

school programs, computer resource centers, and education
programs); DEP'T OF CITYWIDE ADMIN. SERVS., GREEN BOOK:
OFFICIAL DIRECTORY OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 274 (2001)
[hereinafter GREEN BOOK] (listing DPR special programs for "senior
citizens, teenagers, pre-schoolers, the disabled, and homeless").
a
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highlighted the idea of a park as a stage.2 17 Competing visions of
park functions can create conflict.218
By 2001, when Friends of Van Cortlandt Park was decided, at least
six different policies of park functions competed for dwindling
funds: the rural pastoral landscape, the pleasure garden, the center
of recreation, the social and political commons, nature conservation,
and provider of social services. 219 The courts, however have relied
primarily on Williams, which briefly describes park functions and
uses only from the 1920s pleasure ground approach. 22' This is an
inadequate guide to the rich variety and complex possibilities of park
function, especially when the assumptions of park function dictate
allowable park uses.
2. Definitions of Non-Park Uses are Not Clear
Permissible park uses by a municipal park agency are those uses
compatible with proper park purposes. Since park purposes have not
been articulated by courts in any complete way, the only real guide

217. See, e.g., Carol Vogel, Why Is There a Steel Tree in Central
Park? Well, Times Have Changed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at
B 1 (reporting on temporary installations of conceptual art in Central
Park funded largely by outside investors). In 1981 the artist Christo
and his wife were denied permits to put up cloth panels along 27
miles of Central Park pathways. Id.; see also N.C. Maisak, Will the
Gold Loin cloth be Oscar-Worthy?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002, at 6
(describing a performance artist who has performed at Central Park
Bethesda Fountain intermittently over three years).
218. See, e.g., Tara Bahrampour, Abingdon Square Park: A
Triangle in Controversy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, at 4 (detailing a
controversy over whether to highlight a memorial statue in a small
city park or to redesign it "to more of a green landscape park, like in
the 1820's and 30's when it was built").
219. See generally DPR BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 216; see
also GREEN BOOK, supra note 216.
220. See Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750
N.E.2d 1050 (N.Y. 2001); see also Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E.
121 (N.Y. 1920); Brooklyn Park Commrs v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y.
234, 243 (1871).
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to what park uses are permitted as opposed to those which would
require legislative authorization is the common law record.
Because obtaining state legislative approval is difficult, timeconsuming, and can be blocked by community opposition, the
distinction between park and non-park uses is quite important.
Common law furnishes some guideposts but no clear definitions.
Courts have found the following to be permissible uses, when
" ' a valid license for the
conducted pursuant to park purposes:22
222
operation of a park facility; a valid permit for the use of park
facilities;2 3 buildings for park purposes;224 dances, concerts, and
theater;22 monuments and statues;226 restaurants and food facilities;2.7
parking lots; 28 zoos and gardens; 2 9 and concessions. 30
221. See generally 81 N.Y. JUR. 2D §§ 37-44, 60-69 (1989).
222. The license would have to be for a permissible park use. See
STATE GUIDE TO ALIENATION, supra note 126, at 2; see also
discussion infra Part II.B.3.
223. See STATE GUIDE TO ALIENATION, supra note 126, at 2; see
also NEW YORK, N.Y., 62 R.C.N.Y. ch. 1, §§ 1-05 to -08 (2001)
(listing regulated uses and permitted activities).
224. See Davis v. New York, 270 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269-70 (Sup. Ct.
1966) (finding an indoor recreational facility a valid park use).
225. See Terrell v. Moses, 163 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (App. Div.
1957) (observing that the park commissioner may issue permits or
licenses for a musical production but not a lease and dismissing a
suit for lack of standing); Campbell v. Hamburg, 281 N.Y.S. 753
(Sup. Ct. Erie County 1935) (observing that the conducting of
dances contribute to the enjoyment of a park). See generally In re
Shakespeare Workshop v. Moses, 187 N.Y.S. 2d 683, 684-87 (App.
Div. 1959) (indicating that theater productions are a proper park use
consistent with park purposes).
226. See Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 122 (N.Y. 1920).
227. See 795 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d
221, 225-26 (1965) (affirming that restaurants and cafes are
established park uses and holding that it is reasonable for the park
agency to decide on location and type); Gushee v. City of New York,
42 A.D. 37, 41 (App. Div. 1899).
228. Cf. Freidberg v. New York, 151 N.Y.S.2d 258 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1956), aff'd, 153 N.Y.S.2d 541 (App. Div. 1956) (noting that
some parking lots may be permissible in parks).
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Courts have found the following to be non-park uses requiring
state legislative approval: sale of parkland;2 11 long-term leases for
233
non-park purposes;2 3 2 multi-year. disruption. of public access;
disposal of refuse by converting parkland to landfill; 3 1 storage of
city highway and sanitation vehicles; 235 issuance of permits for
private residences on public shores; 236 taking of parkland for city

229. See Williams, 128 N.E. at 122.
230. See generally Gushee, 42 A.D. at 41, 48 (restaurant license).
231. See Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234, 243
(1871). See also supra Section II.A.
232. See Williams, 128 N.E. at 122; see also supra discussion Part
II.B.
233. See Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 95
N.Y.2d 623, 630-31 (2001); see also supra Part II.C.
234. See Stephenson v. County of Monroe, 351 N.Y.S.2d 232,
233-34 (App. Div. 1974). "Mere speculation that one day people
might ski down a mountain of garbage does not make it so." Id.; see
also Vill. of Croton-on-Hudson v. County of Westchester, 331
N.Y.S.2d 883, 884-85 (App. Div. 1972) (disallowing diversion of
twenty acres of public park to a waste disposal site).
235. See Ackerman v. Steisel, 480 N.Y.S.2d 556, 557-58 (App.
Div. 1985), (ruling that storage of non-park vehicles for twenty-five
and fourteen years was not a temporary park use).
236. See Tobin v. Hennessy, 223 N.Y.S. 618, 620, 622 (Sup. Ct.
Bronx County 1927) (finding that the re-issuance yearly of the same
permits was not temporary). "Pelham Bay Park is one of the beauty
spots of our city, made so by God without the use of city money, and
should be kept free and open for the unrestricted use of all the
people." Id. at 620.

302

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. XIII

roads;2 37 restricting a formerly open park to local residents;2 38 and a

diversion of a small portion of public space to private use. 3
The following uses of parks are not clearly alienations or proper
park uses: easements for underground facilities; 24 ° "discontinuance"
of park facilities developed on lands of another; 24 ' and failure to
maintain and operate park and recreational facilities 24 2.
Many contemporary uses of parks are not covered by case law.
Parks, at least in New York City, have a dizzying array of activities
that take place. 43 Much of the debate centers on activities that park
244
agencies contractually agree to.
237. See Central Parkway, 251 N.Y.S. 577, 579-81 (Sup. Ct.
Schenectady County 1931) (observing that parks are held by a
municipality in trust for the public by delegation and may not be
used for non-park purposes).
238. See Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495, 51114 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (public trust prevents restrictions
to local inhabitants without legislative authority).
239. See Lake George Steam Boat Co. v. Blais, 30 N.Y.2d 48, 5052 (1972) (disallowing a lease of village dock facilities to a private
corporation even though public facilities and function would be
provided).
240. See STATE GUIDE To ALIENATION, supra note 126, at 2
(examples are sewer or water pipelines).
241. See id.
242. See id. at 3.
243. DPR BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 216, at 5-53 (listing DPR
activities providing: work experience for welfare recipients,
environmental restoration, Greenstreets program, maintenance of
parks, fund raising, education programs, development of Greenway
paths, preservation of historic structures, planting and maintenance
of street trees, contracting for food concessions, recreational
activities, providing computer centers, partnering for summer
concerts and sports events, hosting art exhibitions, and special events
such as Easter egg hunts and cultural festivals). See generally CITY
OF N.Y./PARKS & RECREATION, at www.nyc.gov/parks (last visited

Apr. 14, 2002) (for links to additional information).
244. See infra pp. 303-06. Sporting events, educational programs,
product launches and publicity, fund-raising events, concessions,
historic house museums, restaurants, gas stations, art exhibits,
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3. Common Law Does Not Address the Range of
Contractual Park Uses
Early New York courts held that licenses were permissible and
leases were not.245 Later courts have looked at the terms of the
agreement rather than what it its called and found that a permit
which functions as a lease is beyond the park commissioner's power
to issue.246

Courts have also looked to see whether the proposed

activity was a proper park use. 47 Contracts involving parks,
however, are not limited to leases and licenses.248 Case law suggests
but does not answer the question whether every contract for use of
parkland is subject to a Williams prohibition against park uses
foreign to park purposes.
In early New York case law and the New York City Charter,
licenses were permissible uses consistent with park purposes and
theater, active and passive recreation, as well as "First Amendment
activities" such as religious talks and political petitioning.
245. Perhaps deciding based on the common law conception of a
lease as conveying an interest in property.
246. See generally Miller v. City of New York, 203 N.E.2d 478,
478-80 (1964) (finding a license document functionally to be a lease
that alienates park property as it conferred exclusive right to use park
land for twenty years with a rental fee).
247. See, e.g., Tompkins v. Pallas, 47 Misc. 309, 309-12 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1905) (analyzing whether a license granted in Bryant
Park for advertising was a park use consistent with park purposes).
The court in Tompkins seemed to find the messages rather than the
signs themselves objectionable to park purposes, describing them as
advertisements for "cheap cigars and Russian teas, of Irish whiskey
and Geneva gin, of a hair restorative and a complexion balm, of
horses and automobiles, of shore dinners and pawnshops, of wall
papers and hose supporters, of rye whiskey and headache powders,
of chiropodists and chemists, and of various other trades and
commodities." Id. at 310.
248. DPR BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 216, 15-20, 25-29
(describing various contracts entered into by the agency: capital
project renovations, requirements contracts, privatizing of parks
vehicles, multi-year food service concessions, special events permits,
and partnership agreements).
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leases were not. A license consistent with park uses granted
authority for a specific act or acts upon the land of another and did
not convey an interest or estate in the land.249 The license had to be
temporary and personal, avoiding the creation of any property
interest. 5° Finally, all licenses had to contain a "terminable at will
clause" stating that the commissioner of parks reserved the right to
cancel the license agreement whenever they decided in good faith to
"'
do so.25
However, the commissioner can be subject to a N.Y.
C.P.L.R. Article 78 requirement that a revocation decision not be
arbitrary or capricious, having no basis in reason and fact. 52

249. See In re Ford, 369 N.Y.S.2d 855, 857-58 (App. Div. 1975),
aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 1000 (1975) (finding a license and not an easement
of passage after the City of New York had purchased watershed
riparian rights through eminent domain). "This right, being a mere
personal privilege giving authority to do acts on the land of another,
did not create any interest in the land itself, and thus constituted a
license rather than an easement." Id. at 857.
250. See Tobin v. Hennessy, 223 N.Y.S. 618, 620 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1927).
251. See Miller, 203 N.E.2d at 480 (finding that a clause reserving
the right to revoke for paramount park purposes was not an adequate
terminable at will clause, and the agreement was more properly an
impermissible lease alienating parkland); Gushee v. City of New
York, 42 A.D. 37, 37-39, 48-49 (App. Div. 1899) (finding that the
Parks Department had discretion to grant and terminate licenses, but
that the Parks Department had acted arbitrarily, capriciously and not
in good faith in prematurely revoking a restaurant license).
252. See In re Shakespeare Workshop v. Moses, 187 N.Y.S.2d
683, 684-87 (App. Div. 1959) (refusing to allow the
Commissioner's imposition of an unnecessarily high fee on free
theater performances as being arbitrary and capricious and serving
no useful park purpose); Theater Festival, Inc. v. Moses, 181
N.Y.S.2d 364, 366 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958) (noting that "in the
absence of clear and convincing proof that a public official has acted
arbitrarily, unreasonably or capriciously, his action will be
sustained" in upholding Commissioner Moses decision to stop
summer theater productions on an off-season ice rink).
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Courts have upheld license agreements for gas stations on the
Henry Hudson Parkway,253 for restaurants and food services in
parks, 24 and for allowing the United Nations to meet in a building in
Flushing Meadow Park.255
In a surprising decision in 1986, the Appellate Division held that
256
not all leases of parkland without legislative sanction were invalid.
The court seemed to be looking beyond the title of the contract to
whether the proposed use served a public purpose.257 In 1996 the
Appellate Division found that a lease of parkland for private summer
cottages was improper, 258 but it based the decision on the proposed
259
use and not the lease itself.
Although case law generally includes decisions involving leases
and licenses, parks management agencies write various contractual
agreements for all sorts of activities in parks. 260 The City of New
York Department of Parks and Recreation, for example, issues very
few leases, but many licenses, special events permits, memoranda of

253. See Kesbec v. City of New York, 67 N.Y.S.2d 900, 903-04
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1946) (allowing an open bidding process for a
gas station franchise on a parkway, noting that a valid license issued
by the Park Commissioner must be motivated by a public purpose
and not a business or profit motive).
254. See Gushee, 42 A.D. at 37, 41, 48.
255. See Curran v. City of New York, 88 N.Y.S.2d 924 (App. Div.
1949).
256. See Port Chester Yacht Club v. Vill. of Port Chester, 507
N.Y.S.2d 465, 467 (App. Div. 1986) (overturning the lower court's
summary judgment finding invalid a lease of village parkland to a
nonprofit membership corporation as it "turns on the nature of the
use rather than the nature of the user").
257. See id. (asking whether the lease for a dock served a public
purpose).
258. See Johnson v. Town of Brookhaven, 646 N.Y.S.2d 180, 181
(App. Div. 1996).
259. See id.
260. Interview with Laura LaVelle, Assistant Counsel, Department
of Parks and Recreation, in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 30, 2001); see
also HARNIK, supra note 48, at 10, 13 (various park contractual
arrangements brought $36 million to the city in one year).
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understanding, and contracts.261 Leases may be issued for a large and
2 62
long-standing use, like a stadium or the Metropolitan Museum.
Agreements for facilities like restaurants are generally written as a
licenses.2 63 Permits are issued for special events like concerts,
2 64
movies, sponsored activities, or sporting and fund-raising events.
Memoranda of understanding are used for inter-agency
agreements.2 65 Contracts are the vehicle for capital construction
projects with outside contractors.266 New York courts have never
definitively addressed whether any and all contractual agreements
must be subjected to a Williams analysis. Case law certainly
suggests that any use of a park must be consistent with park
purposes, but judicial discussion has been confined largely to leases
and licenses.
4. Public Trust Common Law Has Sometimes Been Ignored
While a range of activities may have been officially acknowledged
as areas of questionable park alienation, various types of
unacknowledged park uses have historically taken place and not
been questioned. The historical record of activities allowed in parks
includes both park and non-park uses, as defined by the courts.267
Park commissioners are appointed to their agency offices, have a

261. Interview with Laura LaVelle, supra note 260.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See, e.g., New York, N.Y., Resolution of the Board of
Estimate of the City of New York, No. 192 (May 23, 1964), in 5 J.
OF PROC. OF THE BOARD OF ESTIMATE 4157-62 (1964) (granting
consent to the Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. to
construct, maintain and use a fuel oil pipeline near promenade in
East River Park in Manhattan); Barbara Stewart, Park Emerging
From a Nightmare, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2001, at BI (describing
how in 1968 Columbia University started to construct a gymnasium
in a leased area of Morningside Park and was stopped by protests.of
nearby residents).

2002]

MUNICIPAL PARKLAND IN NEW YORK

307

great deal of discretion in directing park activities,26 and, like other
appointed officials, are subject to the political pressures of municipal
government.269 Most public trust suits are brought by citizens
against the park commissioner, agency, or city."2
The long era of Robert Moses' domination of New York parks,
roads and construction was a time of unprecedented expansion of
parkland and uses of parkland, as well as unbridled discretion and
power. 17 Moses built many facilities in his various capacities as
City Park Commissioner, Constiuction Coordinator, member of City
Planning Commission, State Parks Council, Long Island Park
Commissioner, head of the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority,
and other positions." However, he also used parks 2as74 his personal
build up,275
domain to build roads,2 73 allow food concessions,

268. See 795 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d
221, 225 (1965). "The Park Commission is vested by law with
broad power for the maintenance and improvement of the city's
parks. . . ." Id.
269. See United States v. City of New York, 96 F. Supp. 2d 195,
200 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (city agencies all supported park location as
not requiring legislative approval, despite state attorney general's
opinion that parkland would be alienated).
270. See, e.g., Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York,
750 N.E.2d 1050 (N.Y. 2001) (suit by citizen individuals, citizen
groups, state and federal government against the city, city agencies,
the mayor, and commissioners); Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121
(N.Y. 1920) (suit by citizen against commissioner); Brooklyn Park
Comm'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234 (1871) (suit by citizen against
park commissioners).
271. See CARO, supra note 205, at 9 (contending that Moses'
effective control lasted from 1924 to 1968); see also HARNIK, supra
note 48, at 12-13 (detailing the expansion of the park system under
Moses).
272. See Barbara Stewart, Hungerfor Parklandof All Kinds, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2001, at B1 (noting that Robert Moses added the
most park acres to New York City and built the modem park
system).
273. See, e.g., CARO, supra note 205, at 534-38 (describing West
Side Highway placement in parks).
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deconstruct,276 or restrict access to the parks. 77 The lawsuits that do
survive in the record contesting Moses' treatment of parkland do not
discuss state legislative authorization. 7 8 The information extant
concerning Robert Moses' use of parkland suggests that there were
many unauthorized alienations and non-park uses, that his complete
dominion over parkland was rarely challenged, and that he left a
legacy of non-park uses in parkland.279
5. Common Law Does Not Adequately Address the Questions
"What is a Park and When do Public Trust Protections Apply?"
The question of what is a dedicated park and when should public
trust protections apply has never been an easy one.28 ° When courts

274. See, e.g., id. at 374, 399, 614, 825 (describing how Moses
created a restaurant concession in Central Park and let it to "cronies
for favors").
275. See, e.g., New York, N.Y., Resolution of the Board of
Estimate of the City of New York, No. 258 (Apr. 23, 1964), in 5 J.
OF PROC. OF THE BOARD OF ESTIMATE 3243 (1964) (approving
$28,836,640 for construction of Shea Stadium).
276. See, e.g., CARO, supra note 205, at 338, 678-83 (describing
Moses' demolition of the Central Park Casino and attempted
destruction of Fort Clinton in Battery Park).
277. See, e.g., id. at 318 (describing some of the many ways that
Moses discriminated against African Americans in parks).
278 See supra notes 255-56. See, e.g., Wetter v. Moses, 86
N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941) (finding that Moses had
authority to close the Battery Park Aquarium for construction of the
Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel).
279. See Barbara Stewart, A Reclaimed Park is Due in Fall 2002,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at A41 (recounting how a park that had
been illegally paved over by Robert Moses for construction without
approval of the State Legislature was reclaimed through a suit by
neighbors decades later); cf. HARNIK, supra note 48, at 13 (telling
how Moses tried to run a highway through Washington Square
Park).
280. The New York City Charter and Rules of the City, for
example, define a park as a facility under the jurisdiction of the
DPR. New York City Charter ch. 21, § 533 (2001); NEW YORK,
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attempt to define a park they tend to rely on Williams v. Gallatin or
similar cases.2 8 ' In trying to discern whether public trust restrictions
apply, courts look for an intent to dedicate, either express or implied,
and an acceptance by the city or public, either express or implied.282
Questions about park jurisdiction can arise when parks occur
together with roads or other public works. In a more fundamental
way, the definition of a public municipal park is being thrown into
question by increasing private funding and complex private-public
partnerships.
Common law does not address these questions
explicitly.
a. Roads and PublicAuthorities in Parks
The background restriction on non-park uses in parks has at times
been trumped by legislation specifically empowering certain uses,
creating a scrambled legacy of roads and parks occurring together.283

N.Y., 62 R.C.N.Y. ch. 1, § 1-02 (2001). Community gardens are an
example of a situation where the existence of dedicated parkland has
been contested. See, e.g., Stephen C. Kass and Jean M. McCarroll,
Environmental Justice and Community Gardens, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 27,
1999, at 3; Seth Kugel, Young Protestors Think Globally and Act
Locally to Save a Garden, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10. 2002, sec. 14 at 7
(reporting on a city conflict over a garden, which some community
members and supporters claim is a protected park "Greenthumb"
property, while a local nonprofit plans to use the lot for urban
renewal housing); HARNIK, supra note 48, at 15 (recounting the
conflicts over community gardens in New York City).
281. See 81 N.Y. JUR. 2D, supra note 221, at § 1 (citing Williams
and others). "[A] park is a pleasure ground set apart for the
recreation of the public to promote its health and enjoyment." Id.
282. See, e.g., Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495,
504-07 (Sup. Ct.. Nassau County 1972) (laying out the necessary
elements for a park dedication); Angiolillo v. Town of Greenburgh,
735 N.Y.S.2d 66 (App. Div. 2001) (finding no dedication,- express or
implicit, of parkway land).
283. See, e.g., CARO, supra note 205, at 615-36 (describing the
implementation of Robert Moses' dream of a system of parks and
roads together in Long Island).
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Roadways built with federal funds, and certain public authorities are
examples of activities that have trumped public trust protections.
The Department of Transportation Act of 1966 Section 4(f)
allowed a roadway funded by federal monies to be built through a
park if there was "no prudent and feasible alternative" and the
project was planned to minimize harm. 284
Well before the
Department of Transportation Act was passed, Robert Moses had
pioneered the building of highways through parks,285 and even the
concept of a restricted-access road with a linear park called a
parkway. 86 The federal highway policy approach was modeled on
the parkways and roads that Moses had built in and around New
York City.287 While a recent case found public trust restrictions did
not apply to land adjacent to a parkway,288 roads and parks together
can create confusing jurisdictional issues.289

284. 49 U.S.C. § 303 (1994). The section in question is still called
"Section 4(f)." Policy on lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and
historic sites.
285. See, e.g., CARO, supra note 205, at 615-36 (detailing how
Robert Moses used the public authority to gain vast power, to issue
bonds, condemn land and create parks with transportation projects).
286. Although Olmstead and Vaux had begun the use of parkway
design in America in Brooklyn in 1858, and thirty-eight miles of
parkway were built in the city from 1860 to 1910, Robert Moses
built 416 miles of parkways around New York City after 1920. See
RYBCZYSNSKI, supra note 70, at 281-83; CARO, supra note 205, at 8.

287. See CARO, supra note 205, at 11-12 (noting that the chief
administrative officer of the Interstate Highway system during the
1950s and 1960s.credited Moses with teaching him the principles of
highway construction, that Moses shaped the federal highway bills
and, in fact, exerted more influence on the development of the
federal highway system than any other person).
288. See Angiolillo v. Town of Greenburgh, 756 N.Y.S.2d 66
(App. Div. 2001) (distinguishing a park from a parkway).
289. See, e.g., Rizzo, supra note 95, at 177 (Van Cortlandt Park
has three highways, a railway, and a water tunnel shaft in its
boundaries); Greg Wilson, Happy Trails for the Bronx, DAILY
NEWS, Apr. 23, 2001, 1CN (describing a nature trail built in Van
Cortlandt Park that must traverse three highway roads).
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Public authorities are another legislative creation, which can have
statutory authority to take and use parkland. For example, New
York Public Authorities Law gives the Triborough Bridge and
Tunnel Authority ("TBTA") wide powers to build, condemn
property, raise funds, and acquire city property without
compensation.290 The powers extend to otherwise inalienable land.29'
Transactions can be effected with nothing more than a contract from
the mayor.292 Generally, one city agency would not bring suit
against another, so there is no case law on point, but the statute
allows parkland to be taken for use by TBTA. It should be no
surprise that amendments to the statute creating and vesting almost
unlimited power in the TBTA were written by Robert Moses, who
was head of the authority. 29 3 Since each authority is created
independently by the legislature, its enabling statute will determine
the scope of powers and ability to take and use parkland.
b. Private Fundingand Partnerships
The development of alternative funding sources and management
structures for parks is not acknowledged in legal doctrine. Whereas
the public trust approach may rest on an assumption that parks are
paid for by the public's money, 294 the reality in New York City is
that increasingly parks are funded by private donations.295 In
addition, private-public partnerships are being used to manage and

290. A PUBLIC AuTHORITIEs LAW §§ 553-57 (2001).
291. Id. § 557-a(3)
292. Id. § 557-a(5)
293. See CARO, supra note 205, at 625-31 (describing how Moses,
"the best bill drafter in Albany," wrote amendments granting himself
as head of TBTA almost unlimited funding and power').
294. See Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Armstrong 45 N.Y. 234, 240
(1871).
295. See, e.g., Letter from Regina Peruggi, President of the Central
Park Conservancy, to Cyane Gresham (Nov. 2001)'(on file with the
Fordham Environmental Law Journal). "New York City gives us
the help it can, but over 80% of the cost of maintaining the Park is
borne by the Conservancy." Id.; see also Hamik, supra note 48, at
11-12.
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run parks and programs. 96 Does a privatization of park funding and
management threaten some of the functions that parks have played?
Parks in New York City have a history of relying on
philanthropists when the city's money was not enough. 97 In recent

decades, continued cuts in public funding for parks has drastically
cut budgets. 29' The result has been a unprecedented dependence on
donated money from private sources.299 Money is raised from
individuals and neighborhood groups.3"' The parks department in

New York City actively works to encourage private non-profit

296. See, e.g., CITY OF N.Y. PARKS & RECREATION, BIENNIAL
REPORT (1999) [hereinafter 1999 BIENNIAL REPORT] (listing

partnerships with the City Parks Foundation, Central Park Summer
Stage, Partnerships for Parks, foundation grants, Randall's Island
Sports Foundation, Historic House Trust, historical sign volunteers
and various park conservancies); Lynda Richardson, From a Room
With a View, Going to Bat for Parks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, at
D2 (interviewing the new executive director of the City Parks
Foundation, a "non-profit group that raises money to restore
neighborhood parks"). The non-profit group's offices are in the
Arsenal, headquarters of the City Parks Dept. and site of the 1920
Williams case.
297. See ROSENZWEIG & BLACKMAR, supra note 170, at 303, 48486, 508 (describing three different eras where private donations were
relied on in Central Park); HARNIK, supra note 48, at 11-12 (giving
a brief history of New York City park philanthropy).
298. See Ira Milstein, City Can't Afford to be Stingy With Parks,
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 22 2001, at 45 (reporting that the DPR budget has
been cut by almost seventy percent in twenty-five years and arguing
for an increase). The parks budget used to represent one percent of
the city budget and now represents four-tenths of a percent. Id.; see
also HARNIK, supra note 48, at 14 (inflation-adjusted public
spending on city parks fell by 31% from 1987 to 1996).
299. See, e.g., Letter from Peruggi to Gresham, supra note 295
(public money now pays for less than one quarter of Central Park
budget); HARNIK,'supra note 48, at 11-12.
300. See, e.g., Seth Kugel, In Washington Heights, Residents Wake
Up, Smell the Roses and Save a Garden, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001,
sec. 14 at 8 (Fort Tryon neighborhood residents raised $60,000 to
help city get a grant).
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foundations that work to find resources and support for parks.30 1
And, increasingly, corporations are looked to cover shortfalls in
public funds, and even provide municipal services.3 °2
The increasing reliance on private money in parks has, led to
complex public-private partnerships.3 3 Developers, given special
development privileges, pay for new park and recreational facilities
and ongoing maintenance. 3" Sometimes, in such cases, a separate
nonprofit organization is set up to manage the park project.3 5
Lower-income neighborhood residents and community organizations
may have to organize to get the political clout to obtain resources for
their parks.30 6 In New York City, DPR works with countless non30 7
profit organizations that help raise funds for parks.
301. See DPR BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 216, at 26-31
(describing partnerships).
302. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Bloomberg Passes Hat, Aiming at
Corporate Help, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2002, at Al (reporting that
Mayor Bloomberg is asking corporations to help with the city's four
billion dollar deficit). DPR is used as an example of a city agency
that works with corporations. Id.
303. See HARNIK, supra note 48, at 16 (listing park partnerships
involving Donald Trump, Riverbank State Park above a Harlem
sewage treatment plant, Prospect Park-private foundation, and Bronx
River-state department of transportation).
304. See, e.g., David W. Dunlap, Going Downtown, Downstream,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2001, at F1 (describing how Riverside Park
South was paid for by a development consortium including Donald
Trump); ROSENZWEIG & BLACKMAR, supra note 170, at 208-09
(describing how developers are given additional height authorization
in return for terraces and plazas around high-rise buildings in
Manhattan).
305. See Dunlap, supra note 304, at Fl (describing the Riverside
South Planning Corporation).
306. See, e.g., Barbara Stewart, Gathering at the River to Save an
Ailing Park, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2001, at BI (recounting how
eighteen church organizations formed a coalition to get attention for
East River Park and funds for its rehabilitation).
307. See, e.g., GREEN BOOK, supra note 216, at 274 (stating that
the DPR is ex officio a director, trustee, or manager of thirty-seven
organizations outside of DPR).
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Conflicts among competing interests arose when parks were
administered solely through municipal agencies; 30 8 not surprisingly
questions and conflicts arise when parks are administered through
private-public partnerships3 9 . Who decides what purpose the parks
serves and who decides what are proper park uses? Is a park funded
largely by private money still a public trust resource protected by the
traditional requirements of legislative authorization for non-park
uses?31° Although no answers are easy, there are no answers in
common law because these kinds of questions have not been put to
courts.
Concerns about loss of control to corporate donors and
commercialization of public spaces has perhaps held back
municipalities in the past. 11 If, however, a corporate donor is
responsible for the payment of ongoing park maintenance, it is to be
expected that issues of control, direction and authority to make
decisions will arise.312
308. See, e.g., ROSENZWEIG & BLACKMAR, supra note 170, 263-66
(describing political factions in the governing body of the 1880s city
parks department).
309. See HARNIK, supra note 48, at 15 (describing how Hudson
River Park is not owned by DPR but by a state-chartered authority
which must juggle interests of developers, citizens, and commercial
ventures in the park.)
310. See id. at 523 (asking who decides for Central Park).
311. See Steinhauer, supra note 302, at Al (stating that the city's
budget deficit and new mayor with corporate ties has helped to
overcome previous barriers).
312. See, e.g., Terry Pristin, Bryant Park Agency Replaces Kiosk
Operators,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at B3 (reporting on an abrupt
decision by the business group that oversees Bryant Park to replace
concession operators). Bryant Park in mid-town Manhattan is an
interesting example of this dilemma. Although it is a city park, it is
funded largely through the Bryant Park Restoration Corporation and
run by the Bryant Park Management Corporation. BRYANT PARK
RESTORATION CORP., GARDEN NOTES (2001); see also Bryant Park
General Information, at http://www.bryantpark.org (last visited Apr.
14, 2002). Uses of Bryant Park include movies, concerts, fashion
shows, several food concessions, passive recreation, a traveling
circus, and cultural festivals. "Id. The Restoration Corporation raised
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A more basic concern about privatization of some aspects of parks
is whether the public trust will be sacrificed altogether. Are parks
still democratic spaces if wealthy citizens have nice parks and poor
citizens do not?313 The ebb of public funding has brought to the fore
front harsh questions, not only about public trust protections, but
314
also about what a public park is.

III. IMPROVING PUBLIC TRUST PROTECTIONS OF MUNICIPAL
PARKLAND IN NEW YORK

The long history of public trust protections in New York makes
outright sale of municipal parkland unlikely without legislative
authorization.315 Although it is also improbable that any one
individual will accumulate as much discretionary power to build in
parks as did Robert Moses, 316 park protections are far from
assured.317 The common law public trust doctrine as applied to New
York parks is helpful but incomplete.3"8 Preserving a functional and
robust heritage of public parks accessible to all will require better
articulation of park purposes and uses, enf6rcement of existing
funds to rehabilitate the dilapidated park from abutting property
owners, the city, private donations, a bank loan, and park
concessions. See HARNIK, supra note 48, at 12. On going
management of the park is funded by rental fees, assessments from
abutters, and in-kind entertainment contributions. Id.
313. See Denny Lee, Washington Sq.: First in Their Hearts, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002, sec. 14 at 3 (suggesting that private
conservancies may not be successful in poor areas).
314. See ROSENZWEIG & BLACKMAR, supra note 170, at 529-30
(arguing that in Central Park the "sovereign public" has "surrendered
its commitment to provide free, well-maintained public spaces and
has lost a measure of control over its most important public space").
315. See supra Part L.A (discussing Brooklyn Park Commissioners
v. City of New York).
316. See ROSENZWEIG & BLACKMAR, supra note 170, at 498
(describing 1960s parks commissioner regretting that making
decisions had become so slow and cumbersome).
317. See supra Part II.B.
318. See supra Part II.B.
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protections, and more public funding. This can be accomplished
through legislative and regulatory support, buttressing of the
common law protections against agency overreaching, and intergovernmental cooperation and citizen involvement.
A. Legislative and Regulatory Support
Common law public trust applications are limited by courts to the
facts of specific cases, leading to an inconsistent doctrine.319 The
common law public trust protections of shorelines have in some
states been strengthened and supported by legislation and
regulation.32 ° This approach can be effective if coordinated and
should be applied to park protection."' The legislature and agencies
can provide better definitions, contracting guidelines, and special
protections of natural resources.

319. See DAVID SLADE ET AL., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE TO WORK 345 (1990) (describing how limiting public
trust shore enforcement to the courts results in inconsistent results
and gaps in the doctrine's application); cf. Gionfriddo, supra note 19
(describing how the judiciary has, in some cases, stifled citizen
public trust suits).
320. See SLADE ET AL., supra note 319, at app. I. Other states have
implemented broader environmental statutes modeled on the public
trust. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
321. See ARCHER ETAL., supra note 1, at 165.
In Massachusetts, the judiciary, the legislature, and
various administrative bodies have alternated over the last
three centuries in taking the lead to develop and apply the
public trust doctrine, but with limited overall
coordination ...

[I]t is only in the last twelve years that

this solid but fragmented legal base for the public trust
doctrine has been codified and coherently restructured so
that the doctrine can be effectively and consistently
implemented.
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1. Better Definitions

Park uses consistent with park purposes are already mandated by
statutes funding parks.3 22 Such statutes could flesh out general
definitions for park, recreational, and forest preserve purposes and
still leave considerable flexibility. DPR park regulations, part of the
Rules of the City of New York, already list regulated, permitted, and
prohibited activities.323 Non-park uses could easily be added, as well
as definitions of park purposes. The Court of Appeals in Friends of
Van Cortlandt Park noted that public trust protections may have de
minimis exceptions.2
Such exceptions could be spelled out by
legislation or regulations that define actions having such a small
spatial or temporal impact that legislative approval would not be
required. Funding bills and regulations can also effectively address
the range of park contracts, general limits, and whether they are
subject to the same public trust analysis. Contracting terms for park
permits or concessions determine the uses of parks allowed by
agencies.3 5 The terms of dedication by which a municipality takes
title to a park also determines future purpose and use.326

322. See, e.g., N.Y. PARKS REC. & HiST. PRESERV. LAW § 15.09
(McKinney 1984). "Lands acquired by a municipality with the aid
of funds... [shall not be] used for other than public park and related
purposes without the express authority of an act of the legislature."
Id. "Real property acquired or developed by a municipality with the
aid of funds made available pursuant to this article shall not be sold
or disposed of or used for purposes other than public park, marine,
historic site or forest recreation purposes without the express
authority of an act of the legislature." Id. § 17.09; see N.Y. ENVTL.
CONSERV. LAW § 9-0303 (Gould 2001) (restriction on alienation).
323. ); NEW YORK, N.Y., 62 R.C.N.Y. ch. 5 (2000).
324. Friends of Van Cortlandt Park x. City of New York, 750
N.E.2d 1050, 1054 (N.Y. 2001). "While there may be de minimis
exceptions from the public trust doctrine, the magnitude of the
proposed project does not call upon us to draw such lines in this
case." Id. (emphasis supplied).
325. See supra Part II.B.3.
326. See Kevin A. Bowman, Comment, The Short Term Versus the
Dead Hand: Litigating Our Dedicated Public Parks, 65 U. CIN. L.
REv. 595, 616-17, 642 (1997) (emphasizing that the nature of estate
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2. "Forever Wild" Designation
High quality habitat and valuable natural resources in parks can be
protected with special designations. The "Forever Wild" protection
is used both by the state legislature and by at least one municipal
agency in the state.
On the state level, perhaps the strongest form of protection the
state can afford is a "Forever Wild" designation in the New York
State Constitution.3 27 It is written to protect designated "forest
preserve" land owned by the state.3 28 Any substantial encroachment
on forest preserve land, including timber harvesting, requires a
constitutional amendment.3 29 There has been subsequent case law
interpreting and applying the constitutional provision.330 Statutes
supplement the constitutional mandate.'
Protections of park
woodlands could be greatly strengthened if forest preserves were
designated and constitutionally protected. 32
In an attempt to achieve greater protections of high-quality natural
areas in New York City the DPR Natural Resources Group initiated
in 2001 its own "Forever Wild" program.333

The DPR "Forever

and terms of dedication control future park uses and stressing the
need for a coherent law of public dedication).
327. N.Y. CONST art. 14, § 1 (1996).
328. Id. "The lands of the state now owned or hereafter acquired,
constituting the forest preserve as now fixed by law, shall be forever
kept as wild lands." Id.
329. Id.
330. See id.
331. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 9-0301 to -0307, 710701 to-0715 (Gould 2001).
332. Some observers, however, maintain that the state "Forever
Wild" protections in the Adirondack Park were too heavy-handed
and caused a backlash. See Patricia E. Salkin, The Politics of Land
Use Reform in New York: Challenges and Opportunities, 73 ST.
JoHN'S L. REv. 1041, 1044, 1050 (1999).
333. See NATURAL RES. GROUP, supra note 45 (link available to
view the DRP Natural Resources Group map); see also Maura E.
Lout, Forever Wild in New York City: What's With the New Signs?,
18 URB. AUDUBON 2 (2002) (describing the new city Forever Wild
program and contrasting it to the state program).
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Wild" program has designated over 7,500 acres as off-limits to any
development, to be protected by design review, impact assessment,
negotiation, and litigation."'
B. Common Law Support
Common law itself can be a fertile source of doctrine to bolster
public trust protections. The ultra vires doctrine and trust law duties
for fiduciaries both are applicable and would enhance park
protections against overreaching by municipalities that are entrusted
with management of parks.335 Ultra vires is a term meaning that an
act or contract is unauthorized because the corporation or
organization has gone beyond the power authorized by its charter or
law.336 Municipal corporations are held to strict compliance with
delegated legislative authority.337 When agencies act beyond their
authority, they can be held to be ultra vires.338
Private trust and charitable trust law are other sources of common
law support for restrictions on actions of municipalities. 39 These
334. Id.
335. See ARCHER ET AL., supra note 1, at 5-50 (discussing
analogies of the public trust doctrine to trust law and legislative
delegation of public trust responsibilities).
336. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 1525; see
also N.Y. JUR. 2D § 175 (2001); WILLIAM F. Fox JR.,
UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 42 (4th ed. 2000). "Ultra
vires asks whether an agency is functioning within its statutory
powers." Id.
337. See Fox, supra note 336, at 42 (explaining that an agency
enabling act should set scope of authorization).
338. See id. (reporting that ultra vires challenges to agency actions
are more common than non-delegation challenges, and the
occasionally the ultra vires cases succeed); see also ARCHER ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 46.
339. See ARCHER ET AL., supra note 1, at 35.
Given the consensus that states hold public lands in trust
for the benefit of the public, and the dearth of cases
which have addressed the obligations and responsibilities
of the state as trustee, it is both reasonable and instructive
for states and coastal managers to look to private and

320

FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. XII

arrangements involve a trustee who holds the trust asset for the
benefit of another.34 ° The heightened fiduciary duties of trustees
include the duties of loyalty, of furnishing information, of taking and
keeping control of trust property, of dealing impartially with
" '
beneficiaries, of enforcing claims, and preserving trust property.34
Since the most substantial encroachments on park property are
initiated, sanctioned and permitted by municipalities, it makes sense
to turn to existing common law restrictions on what agency and
trustee actions.

C. Inter-GovernmentalCooperationand Citizen Involvement
Future challenges to parks will require inter-governmental
cooperation and citizen involvement. 42 Cooperation of all branches
of government helps to address the most difficult challenges of park
protection.
Only with concerted effort by the judiciary, the
executive, and the legislative branch will thorny and complicated
issues of overlapping jurisdiction, pre-existing alienations, and the
need for better enforcement be addressed. Although not ideal, parks
and roadways already coexist and will continue to in the future.
Clear guidelines are lacking about what uses are allowed in parks
and roadways. Guidelines will have to address the many different
types of roads and transportation agencies. Pre-existing alienations
are particularly thorny problem, but ignoring their existence weakens
park protections. Park or state regulatory agencies should perhaps
initiate efforts to compile guidelines for areas of overlapping park
and road jurisdiction.
Enforcement of already existing park
charitable trust law for guidance in determining their
rights and obligations as trustees.
Id.

340. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 1519.
341. See SLADE ET AL., supra note 319, 325-30.
342. See Salkin, supra note 332, at 1051-54 (describing regional
planning approach of the Hudson River Greenway Communities
Council which involved over ten municipalities); Barbara Stewart,
Broken Path Along Hudson is Connectedfor Bicyclists, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2001, at 44 (describing how three city agencies and two state
agencies cooperated to complete the Hudson River greenway in New
York City).
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protections could be improved so that common law public trust
restrictions are not ignored. In that regard, citizen involvement is
crucial, since individuals or parks advocate groups are often the ones
who bring challenges to agency actions.
CONCLUSION

Although the common law public trust doctrine has been used as a
theoretical support for increased governmental protection of
common natural resources, in New York City, the reality for the last
three decades has been decreasing government funding for parks and
a resulting increase in privatization of agency functions. Public trust
park protections in New York have succeeded in making sale or
conveyance of municipal parkland very difficult, but they are not
comprehensive enough to deal with the complexities of modern park
contractual arrangements and park management partnerships.
Clearer legislative and agency definitions of park locations, purposes
and uses are essential. Common law doctrinal support and improved
enforcement will certainly help. Intergovernmental cooperation will
be necessary for the multi-party negotiations of the future. Citizens
who organize to maintain and enhance their parks are often the ones
who have filled in the gaps in what agencies can do. However, one
of the best ways to allow public trust protections to work is to
provide adequate public funding for public parks. That will require
leadership and vision.343

343. See HARNICK, supra note 48, at 4 (emphasizing that
leadership and vision are necessary in the design and management of
public parks, and that parks are a vital factor in making cities
competitive as attractive places to locate).

